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INTERNATIONAL  MONETARY  FUND 
The  IMF  Approach  to 
Economic  Stabilization 
1. Introduction 
When  the  International  Monetary  Fund makes  resources  available to a 
member  country to assist with  adjustment  of its balance of payments,  it 
does  so under an agreed arrangement  (or program)  specifying  the condi- 
tions governing  that support.  These conditions,  known  as IMF condition- 
ality, include  both  policies  a member  may  need  to  carry out  prior  to 
approval  of  the  arrangement  (by the  IMF's Executive  Board) and  dis- 
bursement  of the initial tranche  of support,  as well  as policy  undertak- 
ings that must be met for disbursement  of subsequent  tranches over the 
life of the arrangement  (usually  one to three years). 
Of necessity,  the  IMF's approach  to  economic  stabilization  has  vital 
quantitative  features.  Projections must be made  for key macroeconomic 
variables  (national output,  the price level,  the current account  balance, 
and so on), under the policies  to be adopted  under the program. Particu- 
lar attention must be paid to the likely availability of external financing to 
assure that viability is restored  to the country's  external payments  posi- 
tion. As a central element of conditionality,  IMF programs contain quanti- 
tative "performance criteria" for key variables related to macroeconomic 
policies,  which  typically  include  ceilings  for  the  fiscal  deficit  and  the 
central bank's  net  domestic  credit,  and  floors  for net  international  re- 
serves.  These  performance  criteria, which  must  be  agreed  by  the  na- 
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tional  authorities  and  the  IMF, are  calculated  using  a  flows-of-funds 
framework  known  as financial programming.  Thus,  in a general consider- 
ation of quantitative  approaches  to economic  stabilization,  the approach 
employed  by the IMF merits particular scrutiny. 
Over  the  years  as  well  as  recently,  the  IMF approach  to  economic 
stabilization  and especially  IMF conditionality  have been  the subject of 
much controversy.  IMF programs  are often characterized  as unnecessar- 
ily  damaging  to  growth,  harmful  to  the  poor,  unduly  inflexible  and 
unresponsive  to the differing needs  and circumstances  of member coun- 
tries,  and based  on  rigid application  of outmoded  and  discredited  eco- 
nomic  principles.  Some  of these  criticisms can and should  be dismissed 
as factually  inaccurate.1 Others  are based  on  the wishful  thinking  that 
there are easy  policy  choices  or that there should  be virtually unlimited 
concessional  official  financing  (or  grants)  for  countries  with  severe 
balance-of-payments  problems-problems  often  due,  at least partly, to 
the  countries'  own  policy  mistakes.  Other  criticisms  clearly merit  sub- 
stantive consideration.  In individual  cases, while recognizing  that under- 
taking adjustment  to correct external  imbalances  is necessary  and diffi- 
cult and that there are limits to official support,  the degree  of tightening 
of  macroeconomic  policies  and  the  balance  between  adjustment  and 
financing  are always  debatable issues. 
This paper is not primarily concerned  with the latter type of criticisms, 
which  can only be addressed  on a case-by-case basis, but rather with two 
more specific critiques that relate to the quantitative character of the IMF 
approach  to economic  stabilization.  First, because  IMF-supported  pro- 
grams employ  a similar quantitative framework across a very wide  array 
of cases,  there is the accusation  that the IMF approach to stabilization  is 
rigid and unresponsive  to the particular situations  of different members 
and to changing  conditions  over time.  Second,  because  of the common 
practice of setting  quantitative  performance  criteria for fiscal and mone- 
tary policy  in virtually  all IMF-supported  programs,  there is the indict- 
ment  that  the  IMF approach  is based  on  outmoded  economic  models 
and principles  that fail to take account of the complexity  and uncertainty 
1. Chief among  these  are the claims that IMF-supported  programs  seldom  pay attention to 
the effects  of adjustment  on the poor,  that they all contemplate  a fiscal retrenchment  of 
approximately  the same size and composition  which  relies heavily  on regressive  tax rate 
hikes  and  undue  compression  of public  investment,  and  that they  (almost)  invariably 
require a large exchange-rate  devaluation.  The evidence  contained  in numerous  studies, 
conducted  inside  and  outside  the  Fund,  shows  that  all those  claims  are unfounded. 
Some,  but certainly not all, of the studies  that provide  (or refer to) that evidence  include 
Bernstein and Boughton  (1993), Burton and Gilman (1991), Gupta et al. (1998), Heller et 
al. (1988), International  Monetary  Fund (1997), IMF Assessment  Project (1992), Johnson 
and Salop  (1980), Killick (1995, Chapter 3), Nashashibi  et al. (1992), and Schadler et al. 
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of  key  macroeconomic  relationships.  These  accusations,  we  intend  to 
show,  largely reflect misconceptions  about how  the IMF approach oper- 
ates  in  reality, misconceptions  that  are partly due  to the  way  the  IMF 
describes  its programs. 
To understand  the IMF approach  to economic  stabilization  and espe- 
cially how  it functions  in its quantitative  aspects,  it is first essential  to 
understand  the process of an IMF-supported  program,  described  in Sec- 
tion 2. A typical IMF-supported program is not set in stone  at its incep- 
tion, either to proceed  subsequently  in exact accord with the initial plan, 
or to be terminated  because  of some minor deviation.  A program begins 
with  an explicit request  from a member.  IMF staff then  prepares  a blue- 
print of  a  program  that  is  used  as  the  basis  for  negotiations.  When 
agreement  is reached,  often  after hard bargaining  over key elements  of 
the  program,  the  arrangement  has  to be  cleared  by  IMF management 
and  then  approved  by  the  IMF Executive  Board. Thereafter,  disburse- 
ments  proceed  automatically  if all the  performance  clauses  are met  as 
initially specified.  This rarely happens  all the way  through  an arrange- 
ment.  Instead,  if  various  conditions  are  not  met,  deviations  may  be 
accommodated  with  waivers, projections  revised,  and numerical  targets 
changed.  Those  who  participate  in the  process  of IMF-supported  pro- 
grams, from both sides,  do so with full awareness  of their fundamentally 
iterative,  open-loop  character. 
With  an  understanding  of  this  process,  the  economics  of  IMF pro- 
grams is addressed  in Section 3. At their core, IMF-supported programs 
in countries  facing actual or prospective  balance  of payments  (the main 
focus  of  this  paper)  need  to  emphasize  the  country's  actions  in  three 
areas: (1) securing  sustainable  external financing;  (2) adopting  demand- 
restraining measures consistent with available financing; and (3) proceed- 
ing  with  structural  reforms  to promote  growth  and  adjustment  in the 
medium  and longer  term.  The country's  more basic  objectives  of high 
output  growth,  alleviating  poverty, and so forth are not explicitly among 
those  core areas. This does  not  imply  unconcern  with  these  objectives, 
but rather the priority that a country experiencing  severe  extended  pay- 
ments  difficulties  must  assign  in the shorter term to ameliorating  these 
difficulties  and correcting the macroeconomic  and structural imbalances 
at their root,  in order to achieve  more basic  objectives  in a sustainable 
manner over the longer term. 
Beyond  this,  a good  deal of misconception  concerning  the inflexibility 
and  dogmatism  ascribed  to  IMF programs  probably  derives  from  the 
superficial similarity that those programs exhibit in terms of the specifica- 
tion of quantitative  performance  criteria for fiscal and monetary policies. 
Once  account  is taken of the process of IMF-supported  programs,  how- 82 *  MUSSA & SAVASTANO 
ever,  it becomes  apparent  that there  is a great deal  of flexibility  to re- 
spond  both to differences  in circumstances  and to changes  in conditions 
in  individual  cases.  In fact,  properly  understood,  the  intellectual  doc- 
trine associated  with  IMF financial programming  is primarily a recogni- 
tion of basic accounting  identities  supplemented  with  a small number of 
behavioral  relationships  and  forecasts  of  key  economic  variables,  the 
latter two being  subject to revision  as new  evidence  becomes  available. 
This is topped  with  a reasonable  discretion  in judging  both  the  size  of 
the required macroeconomic  adjustment  and the relative effectiveness  of 
the policy  instruments  available to the authorities to undertake  it. 
Before  turning  to  the  main  subject  of  the  paper,  five  further points 
deserve  clarification  and  emphasis.  First, as an international  organiza- 
tion,  the International  Monetary  Fund must  serve the interest of and be 
accountable  to  its  membership,  within  an  established  set  of  policies, 
procedures,  and practices  that assure  reasonable  equality  of treatment, 
with  due recognition  of differences  in circumstance.  In short, not every- 
thing  goes.  A degree  of conservatism  in Fund arrangements  is not only 
inevitable,  but also desirable. 
Second,  under  its legal charter, the Articles of Agreement,  IMF finan- 
cial support  to members  is supposed  to  serve  a particular purpose,  as 
specified  by Article I(iv): 
To give  confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund 
temporarily  available to them under adequate  safeguards, thus providing them 
with the opportunity to correct maladjustments  in their balance of payments 
without resorting  to measures  destructive  to national  or international  prosperity. 
Plausible  assurance  that a member's  use  of the Fund's resources  will be 
temporary  requires  a reasonable  expectation  of a member's  sufficiently 
early return to external-payments  viability  (so that the member  will be 
able to repay the Fund). Indeed,  the primary legal justification for condi- 
tionality,  as  provided  in  Article  V  of  the  Articles  of  Agreement,  is  to 
impose  "adequate  safeguards"  that render that plausible  assurance.  No 
one may reasonably argue that the IMF should ignore this constraint in its 
conditionality.  Moreover, the IMF has no authority to write down  claims 
against members who  fall into arrears on their obligations  to the Fund; in 
the end,  those members become  outcasts  of the international community 
with prolonged  and dire consequences.  In the application of conditional- 
ity, prudence  to contain  the risks of such  situations  is clearly essential. 
Third, while  we  do not review  them here,  empirical studies  that have 
evaluated  the  macroeconomic  effects  of IMF-supported  programs  have 
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do, namely, improve  the current-account balance and the overall balance 
of  payments  of  countries  experiencing  external  payments  difficulties. 
And  the  most  careful studies,  which  attempt  to correct for a variety  of 
econometric  difficulties,  confirm that this association  is something  more 
than the usual  tendency  for things  to get better when  they are very bad 
to  start  with.2  Other  macroeconomic  effects  associated  with  IMF- 
supported  programs-on  output growth,  on inflation,  and so forth-are 
more difficult  to pin  down,  especially  when  proper account  is taken of 
all the other factors that influence  the outcome  of a program. If anything, 
the  results  tend  to  show  negative  initial  effects  on  output,  while  the 
effects on inflation  are often not statistically significant. 
Fourth, for exchange-rate  policy  (not discussed  in detail in the rest of 
the  paper),  it  is  not  the  case  that  the  IMF imposes  its  views  on  all 
members,  or that those  views  (almost)  always  entail a devaluation  and 
abandonment  of currency  pegs  for "more flexible" regimes.  True, dis- 
cussions  about exchange-rate  policy  and,  in particular, the dismantling 
of exchange  restrictions  (an area that falls under  the  direct purview  of 
the  IMF as  stated  in  Article  VIII of  the  Articles  of  Agreement)  are 
important  and  at times  central aspects  of program  negotiations.  More- 
over,  in  some  cases  the  reform  of  the  foreign  exchange  system  or an 
exchange-rate  devaluation  become  preconditions  ("prior actions")  for 
Board approval of an IMF arrangement.  But this is hardly the norm.  As 
in other areas, negotiations  over exchange-rate  policy  give  considerable 
weight  to  the  views  and  desires  of  the  member  country.  The  many 
arrangements  approved  for  countries  in  the  CFA  franc  zone  in  the 
years  prior to the January 1994 devaluation  of the  CFA franc (a period 
when  IMF staff voiced  repeatedly,  though  subtly, its concerns  about the 
harmful effects of maintaining  the old parity) attest to this fact. So does 
the  evidence  from  a large  number  of Fund  arrangements  approved  in 
the  1980s that is reported  in an external evaluation  of IMF conditional- 
ity  and  that  led  the  authors  to  conclude,  with  some  surprise,  that: 
"perhaps  the  strongest  tendency  of  IMF conditionality  was  to  leave 
existing  exchange-rate  policies  intact" (IMF Assessment  Project,  1992, 
p.  39).3 That  substantial  deference  is  given  to  national  authorities  in 
2. The empirical  literature  on the macroeconomic  effects of IMF-supported  programs is 
quite extensive. However, the question is difficult to address and the methodologies 
employed (particularly  the earlier  ones) have serious shortcomings,  especially  with the 
so-called "problem  of the counterfactual"-i.e.,  ascertaining  what would have been 
different in the absence of an IMF  program-see  Goldstein and Montiel (1986),  Khan 
(1990),  and Dicks-Mireaux  et al. (1995).  See Haque  and Khan  (1998)  for a recent  survey of 
this literature. 
3. In the 1990s,  views of country  authorities  have continued to play a key role in shaping 
exchange-rate  policy in IMF-supported  programs.  For  example,  Argentina  made its own 84 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
their exchange-rate  and  other  economic  policies  is a reflection  both  of 
the right of members  to determine  their own  policies,  and of the experi- 
ence  showing  that  IMF programs  tend  to  perform  best  when  their 
associated  policies  are most closely  "owned" by the national  authorities 
in charge of implementing  them. 
Fifth,  substantial  deference  to  national  authorities,  however,  still 
means that Fund arrangements  impose  tangible constraints on economic 
policies.  This implies  that there is an unavoidable  political-economy  com- 
ponent  to IMF conditionality.  National  authorities  may  modify  policies 
to  comply  with  IMF conditionality  when  it would  be  difficult  to  find 
domestic  political  consensus  in  the  absence  of  external  pressure.  On 
behalf  of the international  community,  the IMF attaches conditions  that 
the  ultimate  providers  of IMF resources  might  find  difficult  to request 
and  enforce  on  a bilateral basis.  Thus,  the  IMF and  its  conditionality 
become  a "scapegoat"  on  both  sides  of  the  bargain  (see  James,  1998). 
That such  a scapegoat  can be useful  in securing  necessary  or desirable, 
but unpopular,  policy  adjustments  is clear. That the IMF might  actually 
be counterproductive  because  of the political consequences  of its condi- 
tionality  and the hostility  associated  with its scapegoat  function is also at 
least  a debatable  issue  (see  Shultz,  1995, and  Feldstein,  1998). We will 
not attempt to resolve  this debate.  We note,  nonetheless,  that the IMF is 
the creature of its members  and is accountable  and responsive  to them; 
the  IMF cannot,  in  broad  terms  and  over  a sustained  period,  pursue 
policies  which  the members  do not generally  approve. 
2.  The  Process  behind  IMF-Supported  Programs 
IMF programs  are,  in  practice,  quite  flexible.  An  IMF-supported  pro- 
gram is  not the  initial  agreement  negotiated  with  a member.  A  Fund- 
supported  program is a process.  It evolves  along a multiplicity  of poten- 
decision to adopt a currency  board in early 1991, and received support from an IMF 
arrangement  only in July  of that year. When the peg came under intense pressure  in the 
tequila  crisis  of 1995,  a new program  supported  by the IMF  helped Argentina  sustain its 
decision to preserve its currency  board. In mid-December  1994, Mexico devalued the 
peso and then moved to a floating rate before reaching any agreement  with the IMF 
Also outside any Fund arrangement,  Brazil adopted the Real Plan in mid-1994 and 
defended it against intense pressures in the tequila crisis and from the Asian crisis 
beginning in October 1997. When Brazil  requested, negotiated, and agreed on a pro- 
gram supported by the IMF  in November 1998, the decision to continue with the Real 
Plan was fundamentally  a decision of the Brazilian  authorities.  As market pressures 
intensified  in mid-January  1999,  the decision to devalue the real and subsequently  to let 
it float was again a decision of the Brazilian  authorities,  although with knowledge that 
the IMF  and the international  community  probably  would not continue to support an 
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tial pathways,  driven  by exogenous  economic  events,  by policy  actions 
of the national  authorities,  and by the responses  of the IMF staff, man- 
agement,  and  Executive  Board,  within  the  general  framework  of  the 
Fund's  policies  governing  assistance  to members.  Those  who  work  on 
IMF programs,  inside  the Fund or with  the national  authorities,  gener- 
ally understand  the iterative and open-loop  nature of the process. 
The process  involves  two main parties: a country facing external pay- 
ments  problems  rooted in macroeconomic  and/or structural imbalances, 
and the IMF with a mandate  to offer financial and technical assistance  to 
members  that undertake  economic  adjustment.  From the country's  side, 
the  process  is delimited  by  the  authorities'  capacity  and willingness  to 
implement  the measures needed  to resolve their external payments  prob- 
lems.  From the IMF's side, the process is governed  by policies  and proce- 
dures that regulate the access to, and uses of, IMF financing-i.e.,  by IMF 
conditionality.  These policies  and procedures  have evolved  over five and 
a half decades  from a few general guidelines  to a more complex body that 
reflects the major changes  in the international  monetary  system  during 
this period  and the effects  of those  changes  on an expanding  and more 
heterogeneous  IMF membership-see  Polak (1991) and  Guitian  (1995). 
Notwithstanding  its  increased  complexity  (reflected  also  in  a growing 
number  of facilities  tailored  to the  needs  of particular groups  of coun- 
tries), the core process  underlying  IMF-supported  programs has proved 
to be  remarkably  resilient  in its main  features.  Indeed,  with  relatively 
minor differences  across the various  types  of facilities, that process  com- 
prises  six broadly  defined  phases:  inception,  blueprint,  negotiation,  ap- 
proval,  monitoring,  and completion  (Figure 1). 
2.1 INCEPTION 
IMF programs  get underway  when  the authorities  of a member  request 
financial assistance  from the IME The request need  not be written; nor- 
mally  an  oral communication  from  the  authorities  to  IMF staff  and/or 
management  suffices.  Prior discussions  with staff or management  some- 
times  precede  a request,  but the decision  to request  support  rests with 
the country's  authorities.  Indeed,  in the regular process  of IMF surveil- 
lance,  staff or management  may impress  upon  the authorities  the need 
to adopt measures  to redress actual or potential  external or other macro- 
economic  imbalances,  but it is up to the country authorities  whether  and 
when  to take up that advice  (see Mussa,  1997). Often,  authorities  delay 
required adjustment,  and domestic  and external imbalances  worsen  sig- 
nificantly  before  a request  for assistance  from  the  IMF (see  Santaella, 
1996, and Knight and Santaella,  1997). As a consequence,  IMF programs 86 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
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often  start with  crisis  or near-crisis  conditions  in  the  balance  of  pay- 
ments,  necessitating  rapid policy  responses  to normalize  external pay- 
ments  and correct underlying  macroeconomic  imbalances. 
2.2 BLUEPRINT 
When  a request  for  IMF assistance  is  made,  IMF staff  from  the  area 
department  responsible  for relations  with  the  member  prepare  a blue- 
print  of  an  adjustment  program.  The  blueprint  takes  account  of  key 
characteristics  of  the  country-e.g.,  membership  in  a currency  union, 
size  of the public  sector,  depth  and  soundness  of the  financial system, 
access  to  international  capital  markets-features  that  the  IMF  staff 
knows  well  from  its  regular  surveillance  and  preprogram  discussions 
with  the  authorities.  The blueprint  also  contains  a preliminary  assess- The  IMF  Approach  to Economic  Stabilization  *  87 
ment  of the proximate  and underlying  sources  of the  aggregate  imbal- 
ances  that  have  caused  the  deterioration  of  the  country's  balance  of 
payments,  gauges  the  size  of  the  external  disequilibria,  evaluates  the 
authorities'  response  to  the  unfolding  crisis,  and  outlines  the  central 
elements  of an adjustment  program that could warrant financial support 
from  the  IME  The  staff  then  makes  proposals  regarding  the  type  of 
financial arrangement,  the size  of the IMF loan,  and the time profile of 
the  disbursements  that  appear  compatible  with  the  country's  external 
financing  needs  (the access and phasing under the arrangement),  and the 
key policy  measures  that it would  be advisable  to have  in place  before 
providing  any IMF financing  (prior  actions).4 
A  briefing  paper  summarizing  the  blueprint  and  containing  a first 
attempt  at  gauging  its  quantitative  implications  in  terms  of  a  simple 
flow-of-funds  accounting  framework  of  key  macroeconomic  relation- 
ships  is then prepared  and circulated for comments  to other (non-area) 
departments  of  the  IME The  flow-of-funds  framework  uses  the  latest 
annual  estimates  for the  country's  main  macroeconomic  variables  and 
preliminary  projections  for at least one  year ahead  that incorporate  the 
expected  effects  of the proposed  adjustment  measures.  Consistent  with 
the primary (and often  pressing)  goal  of restoring balance-of-payments 
viability,  the  projections  emphasize  the  expected  evolution  of  interna- 
tional  reserves,  the  current  account,  domestic  credit  growth,  and  the 
public-sector balance during the adjustment period; the rates of inflation 
and  of  output  growth,  the  ultimate  objectives  of  all  adjustment  pro- 
grams, play a central role in the short-run projection exercise but are not 
regarded  as  formal  targets  of  the  prospective  arrangement.  A  revised 
blueprint  incorporating  comments  from departments  is then  submitted 
to IMF management  for clearance. Management  evaluates  the blueprint 
and decides  on the prior actions that should  be sought  from the authori- 
ties,  as well  as on the  access  and phasing  proposals  made  by the staff. 
2.3 NEGOTIATION 
After the briefing paper is cleared by management,  a mission  visits  the 
member  to  start negotiations  (though  sometimes  negotiations  may  be 
held at Fund headquarters  or in some other location).  Normally, the mis- 
sion's first task is to revise its estimates  of external disequilibrium  and of 
underlying  macroeconomic  imbalances  and  assess  whether  the  adjust- 
ment effort envisaged  in the blueprint remains broadly adequate.  Even if 
revisions  are not substantial,  which  they often are, the mission  makes it 
4. For a description  of  the  various  types  of Fund  arrangements  and  facilities  and  of the 
terms and conditions  of IMF lending  (as well  as of the peculiar Fund terminology)  see 
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clear to the authorities  that negotiations  will be conducted  ad referendum, 
and that no agreement is final until the program is cleared by IMF  manage- 
ment and approved by the IMF's Executive Board. In general, when  agree- 
ment is reached, it represents  a compromise  between  the blueprint in the 
staff's briefing paper and the initial negotiating  position  of the country's 
authorities. 
Negotiations  over  some  key  aspects  of  the  program  can be  conten- 
tious,  though  rarely openly  confrontational.  Disagreements  about goals 
are not  as  common  as  disagreements  about  the  policies  necessary  to 
attain  those  goals.  Typically, country  authorities  tend  to  advocate  less 
tightening  of fiscal and monetary policies  and a slower  pace of structural 
reforms than those  suggested  by the staff, but there are cases where  it is 
the  staff  who  stands  for  an  easing  of  the  policy  stance  or  some 
rebalancing  of  the  policy  mix.  When  the  staff  requests  that  certain 
actions-e.g.,  the  dismantling  of  exchange  restrictions,  the  lifting  of 
interest-rate  ceilings-be  taken  before  Board approval  of the  program 
and  disbursement  of  the  first tranche  of  the  IMF loan,  the  scope  for 
disagreements  and dispute  tends  to increase. 
Program negotiations  often take place  over the course  of several  mis- 
sions.  If a serious  impasse  is reached,  program  discussions  are put  on 
hold.  Typically, when  negotiations  resume  (and they  normally  do),  the 
country's  situation  has  worsened  markedly,  requiring  revisions  to  the 
staff's  blueprint.  Once  the authorities  and the staff reach agreement  on 
the policies needed  to underpin  the adjustment  effort, they negotiate  the 
more  technical  features  of the Fund  arrangement.  Those  features  com- 
prise  the  mode  and  frequency  of  monitoring  performance  under  the 
arrangement  (i.e.,  macroeconomic  and  structural performance  criteria, 
structural  benchmarks,  midterm  reviews)  and  the  relation  between 
those  performance  clauses  and the provision  of IMF financing.  Discus- 
sion  of  these  features  usually  involves  updates  of the  basic  macroeco- 
nomic  framework  in the IMF staff's blueprint.  This iterative procedure, 
the hallmark of financial programming,  enables the staff and the authori- 
ties  to assess  in simple  quantitative  terms the interactions  between  the 
policy  measures  agreed  on and the main targets of the adjustment  pro- 
gram.5 After reaching agreement  on numerical values  for the main objec- 
tives  of the  program,  normally  for at least  one  year ahead,  authorities 
and staff negotiate  numerical  values  for the quarterly path of a small set 
of macroeconomic  variables used  to monitor  the authorities'  adjustment 
effort. Two such  intermediate  variables  on which  almost  all IMF programs 
5. See Robichek (1985) and Polak (1997) for discussions  of financial programming  as prac- 
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focus  are the public-sector  deficit and creation of domestic  credit by the 
central bank. Typically, the behavior of those variables during the first 6- 
12  months  of  the  arrangement  become  formal  performance  criteria, 
while  the numerical  values  for the outer dates  are indicative targets sub- 
ject to revision  in the program's midterm reviews. 
The outcome  of the negotiations  is summarized  in a letter of intent. The 
letter and its attachments spell out the main objectives of the program, the 
policy  actions and reforms that the authorities  have  taken and intend  to 
take under the arrangement  (especially  those  for the first year), and the 
modality  and frequency of the performance clauses and monitoring  tech- 
niques agreed on with the staff. The letter of intent signed by the country 
authorities is their formal request for IMF financing and marks the end of 
the (initial) negotiation  phase. 
2.4 APPROVAL 
Back at headquarters,  the mission  team prepares  a staff report  containing 
an account  of discussions  with  the authorities  and of the policy  under- 
standings  reached  with  them.  The report is accompanied  by a detailed 
macroeconomic  framework,  which  typically  includes  a full set of projec- 
tions  of  the  country's  fiscal,  monetary,  and  balance-of-payments  ac- 
counts covering  at least the first full year under the IMF arrangement,  as 
well  as a medium-term  scenario  showing  the progress  toward  external 
viability envisaged  over  a five-year  period.  The report also includes  an 
appraisal by the staff of the main risks and uncertainties  (of both external 
and  domestic  nature)  surrounding  the  proposed  adjustment  program, 
and  a summary  of  the  technical  features  of  the  financial  arrangement 
(i.e.,  duration,  access and phasing  of the IMF loan, and the performance 
clauses  ascribed to the various  tranches). 
The staff  report and  the  letter of intent  are then  circulated  for com- 
ment  to several  non-area  departments,  which  check  that the proposed 
program  remains  broadly  consistent  with  the blueprint  in terms of the 
adjustment  effort,  the attainability of the program's primary goals,  and 
the application  of IMF conditionality.  Departments  also offer their views 
about  the  risks  of  the  proposed  arrangement-views  which  may  not 
coincide  fully  with  those  of the originating  area department.  A revised 
draft of the staff report is then  submitted  to management  for clearance. 
Management  makes the final decision  on the size and phasing  of the IMF 
loan but generally makes no changes  to the projections and other techni- 
cal features  of the  arrangement  or to the policy  understandings  agreed 
by  the  mission.  Increasingly,  especially  in  important  cases,  manage- 
ment's  view  and guidance  are provided  on a continuous  basis through- 
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When cleared by management,  the staff report and letter of intent are 
distributed  to  the  IMF Executive  Board,  and  a  date  is  set  for  Board 
discussion  of the proposed  arrangement,  with  the actual meeting  some- 
times made contingent  on implementation  of prior actions by the authori- 
ties.  Management  must  recommend  approval  of all IMF programs  as a 
requirement  of  consideration  by  the  Executive  Board.  Although  there 
often are expressions  of concern or even occasional abstentions,  manage- 
ment's  recommendations  have  invariably  been  accepted  by  the  IMF 
Board. However,  the  views  of  Executive  Directors  and  of the  national 
authorities  they represent have substantial  importance.  The Board meet- 
ing is the occasion when  Executive  Directors, representing  the 182 mem- 
ber countries,  could reject the proposed  program,  and that fact provides 
an incentive  for IMF management  and  staff  to  take  to  the  Board only 
programs  that  they  expect  will  command  its  support.  Board meetings 
signal  the  international  community's  endorsement  of  the  adjustment 
program.  Executive  Directors  use  Board  meetings  to  indicate  to  IMF 
management  and staff, and to the representatives  of the borrowing  coun- 
try, the aspects  of the adjustment  strategy they consider  essential  for the 
attainment of the program's goals-and  therefore for the continuation  of 
their support  for the  arrangement.  Through  this process  the Executive 
Board exerts,  over  time,  considerable  influence  on  IMF conditionality. 
Table 1 reports  the  number  of  IMF arrangements  approved  by  the 
Executive  Board in five year intervals,  and by type  of facility, from 1973 
to 1997, as well  as the number  of countries  that received  IMF financing 
during  that period,  broken down  by region.  The figures  in the table can 
be  interpreted  in many  ways.  However,  the  sheer  fact that in the  last 
twenty-five  years the Fund has approved  a total of 615 arrangements  for 
126 (developing)  countries  that have  confronted  all types  of balance-of- 
payments  difficulties  is prima facie evidence  that the process  leading  to 
the approval of IMF programs possesses  enough  flexibility to respond  to 
the different  and evolving  needs  of a heterogenous  membership.  Board 
approval  leads  to the release  of the first tranche  of the IMF loan.  What 
happens  thereafter, and in particular what determines  the disbursement 
of remaining  tranches of an IMF loan,  is decided  in the following  (fifth) 
phase  of the process. 
2.5 MONITORING 
Monitoring  is the  longest  and  probably  most  important  phase  of IMF- 
supported  programs,  covering  a one- to three-year period when  the bulk 
of the IMF loan is usually  scheduled  to be disbursed.  Monitoring involves 
much  more  than  periodically  checking  compliance  with  the  numerical 
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it entails  a continuous assessment  by  the  staff  of  developments  in  the 
borrowing  country and of their implications  for the attainment of the main 
goals  of the  program.  Monitoring  requires  keeping  track of the  timely 
implementation  of the policy  measures  agreed by the authorities  and of 
the behavior  of variables beyond  the authorities' control that impinge  on 
the  macroeconomic  projections  on  which  the  arrangement  was  based. 
Monitoring  acquires  a formal  dimension  at the  so-called  test dates at 
which  performance  criteria need  to be met  in order for tranches  of the 
IMF loan to be disbursed.  Test dates  are typically  set at quarterly inter- 
vals  (though  recently  some  Fund arrangements  have  used  monthly  test 
dates)  and can be of two  types: those  where  performance  is assessed  in 
an essentially  backward-looking  manner,  mainly  in terms of numerical 
performance  criteria, and those  which,  in addition,  require the satisfac- 
tory completion  of a program review  that assesses  the forward-looking 
potential  for the program  to meet  its primary objectives.  Both monitor- 
ing techniques  share "the positive  function  of ensuring  a member's  ac- 
cess  to Fund  resources  when  the  conditions  are met,  and  the negative 
function  of  interrupting  access  when  the  country  has  failed  to  meet 
them" (Polak, 1991, p.  14). 
Performance  of a country  under  an IMF-supported  program  can fol- 
low  four possible  tracks (Figure 1): (1) The country may comply  with  all 
performance  clauses  established  at the  beginning  of  the  arrangement 
and  with  relatively  minor  updates  of the  clauses  made  in program  re- 
view(s)  and hence  be eligible  to receive  all the  disbursements  from the 
IMF loan  according  to  the  original  schedule.  (2) The  country  may  be 
unable  to comply  with  one  or more performance  clauses  at some  point 
during  the  arrangement,  but  a waiver  of  the  unmet  criterion  may  be 
granted  or  a  modification  in  the  program  may  be  rapidly  agreed  on 
which  allows  the arrangement and its disbursements  to proceed without 
interruption.  (3) Substantial  deviations  from performance  clauses  may 
lead to a situation where  it is not possible  to agree rapidly on a modifica- 
tion of the program and on policy  actions to bring the program back on 
(modified)  track, thereby  prompting  the  interruption  of disbursements 
from the IME In many of these  cases,  following  a new  round of negotia- 
tions,  a revised  program  can be  agreed  on  and  disbursements  can be 
resumed;  sometimes,  the amounts  of disbursements,  their phasing,  and 
the  length  of  the  arrangement  are modified.  (4) The  country  may  be 
unable  to comply  with  one  or more performance  clauses  at some  point 
during  the  arrangement,  and  in the ensuing  negotiations  the  staff and 
the  authorities  may  not  reach  agreement  on  a  revised  program;  the 
arrangement  then becomes  inoperative  and disbursements  cease. 
Programs that comply  fully with all the initial performance  clauses  are Table 1  IMF ARRANGEMENTS 1973-1997a 
No. of 
1973-77  1978-82  1983-87  1988-92  1993-97  Total  countries 
Number  of arrangements  approved  during  the period  (cumulative  flows) 
Total  85  124  139  126 
Standby  82  99  110  75 
Extended  Fund facility  3  25  7  10 
SAF/ESAF  22  41 
Number  of arrangements,  by type  of country 
Total  85 
Industrial countries  6 
Developing  countries,  by region: 
Africa  19 
Asia  25 
Central and eastern  Europe  2 
Central Asia and other 
Middle  East and Europe  4 






60  84  55 
20  16  14 
5  3  17 
1 
5  3  3 
32  32  36 
Amounts  committed  under  arrangements  (SDR billion)  (cumulative  flows) 
Total  9.1  29.5  29.2  35.5 
Stand-By  8.3  13.8  18.8  15.8 
Extended  Fund facility  0.8  15.7  9.2  15.4 






































11.8 Countries  with  nine  or more Fund arrangements  approved  between  1973 and 1997, by region 




































Source:  IMF, Transactions  of the Fund (1998). 
aIncludes  standby arrangements,  EFF arrangements,  and arrangements  under the SAF and ESAE Excludes STF arrangements  and 
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not the norm.  The majority of IMF arrangements  follow  one of the three 
other tracks. This is not surprising,  when  one considers  the assumptions 
about  the  behavior  of  external  and  domestic  variables  and  about  the 
timeliness  of policy  implementation  that need  to be made  when  setting 
numerical  values  for the  intermediate  variables  chosen  as performance 
criteria and agreeing on the pace of structural reforms. Indeed,  recogniz- 
ing the need  to give Fund arrangements  sufficient flexibility to withstand 
departures  from  their  initial  assumptions,  IMF conditionality  became 
gradually  equipped  with  a number  of  technical  provisions-e.g.,  ad- 
justors,  waivers,  rephasing,  modifications,  extensions-that  facilitated 
making midcourse  revisions  to the arrangements approved by the Execu- 
tive Board (see Polak, 1991, and International  Monetary  Fund,  1998). 
Typically, revisions  of IMF programs  are triggered  by the authorities' 
(actual  or imminent)  failure  to comply  with  one  or more  performance 
clauses.  When large deviations  are detected or foreseen,  a mission  travels 
to the borrowing  country  to negotiate  possible  revisions  to the arrange- 
ment,  based  on  an updated  blueprint  that outlines  the  conditions  that 
would  justify maintaining  or resuming  lending  from the IME Key issues 
are whether  deviations  were caused  primarily by slippages  in the imple- 
mentation  of agreed policies  or by factors beyond  the authorities' control, 
and what remedial policy measures  are needed  to correct the situation.  If 
the staff and the authorities  agree on a revised  program,  the staff (with 
management  approval) presents  a report to the Executive Board indicat- 
ing  the  revisions  to the  arrangement.  The country  becomes  eligible  to 
resume  access to the IMF loan immediately  after the Board's approval of 
the report. If the staff and the authorities  are unable to reach agreement, 
however,  disbursements  from the IMF loan remain suspended  and the 
arrangement  stays permanently  off track, until it expires. 
The data in Table 2 show  that more  than a third of all Fund arrange- 
ments  approved  between  1973 and  1997 ended  with  disbursements  of 
less than half of the initially agreed support.  In a few of these  cases,  the 
program was  so successful  (or conditions  improved  so rapidly) that the 
member  needed  to use  only  a fraction of the committed  IMF financing. 
Mainly,  however,  these  were  cases  where  the  program  went  off  track 
because  policies  deviated  significantly  from those  agreed  with  the IMF 
and  subsequent  negotiations  failed  to  reach agreement  on  a modified 
program.  Cases  where  50  to  75% of  the  initially  agreed  support  was 
disbursed  (17.6% of  all IMF arrangements)  are more  of  a mixed  bag: 
some  highly  successful,  some  canceled  programs  that  were  followed 
rapidly  by  new  arrangements,  and  some  that  went  permanently  off 
track.  Cases  where  75% or more  of the  IMF loan  was  disbursed  (45.5%  of 
all  arrangements)  are  generally  those  where  the  authorities  adhered Table 2  FRACTION OF IMF LOAN  ACTUALLY DISBURSED UNDER  EACH ARRANGEMENT, 
DISTRIBUTION BY QUARTILES 
(x=fraction  of total IMF loan disbursed  under  each arrangement)a 
Percent of Total Arrangements 
Fully disbursed  Number of 
x<0.25  0.25<x<0.50  0.50-x<0.75  0.75-x<1.0  (x=1.0)  arrangements 
All arrangementsb 
1973-1977  36.5  7.1  5.9  5.9  44.7  85 
1978-1982  19.4  16.1  10.5  12.9  41.1  124 
1983-1987  12.9  15.8  19.4  7.9  43.9  139 
1988-1992  17.5  15.1  20.6  14.3  32.5  126 
1993-1997C  27.0  19.1  26.2  11.3  16.3  141 
Full period  (1973-1997)c  21.6  15.3  17.6  10.7  34.8  615 
of which: 
Stand byc  23.1  13.4  15.0  9.5  39.0  441 
EFFC  33.3  22.2  19.0  15.9  9.5  63 
SAF/ESAFC  9.0  18.9  27.0  12.6  32.4  111 
Source:  IMF, Transactions  of the Fund (1998). 
aCalculated as the ratio of the total purchases  made  to the full amount  of IMF resources  committed  under  each arrangement. 
bIncludes standby  arrangements,  EFF arrangements,  and  arrangements  under  the  SAF and  ESAF. Exludes  STF arrangements,  and  drawings 
under the first credit tranche and the CCFF. 
cThe distribution  of the ratio x for the  1993-1997  period  is biased  (downward)  by the inclusion  of arrangements  with  expiration  date posterior  to 
1997. The bias is also present  in the distributions  reported  for the full period  (1973-1997). 96 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
more closely  to the policies  they agreed to over the course of the arrange- 
ment.  Even among  these  cases,  however,  rare were  the instances  where 
every performance  criterion and numerical objective of the program was 
met  as  originally  envisaged.  The  "success"  of  IMF programs  in  these 
cases signifies  that it was possible  to sustain  an adjustment  effort accept- 
able to both  the countries'  authorities  and the IMF during  the program 
period,  not that programs  attained  the numerical  targets of the original 
arrangement. 
2.6 COMPLETION 
Formally,  IMF programs  are completed  when  the  borrowing  country 
becomes  eligible  for  the  last  tranche  from  the  IMF loan.  Because  of 
revisions  during  the course  of the program,  that date may be later than 
the  original  expiration  date  of  the  arrangement  and  the  disbursement 
may add to a total that can be higher or lower than the amount  contem- 
plated in the original arrangement.  Table 3 provides  a general indication 
of the relative frequency  of these  outcomes.  For the total of all 615 Fund 
arrangements,  73 were extended  beyond  their original durations.  By and 
large, these were cases where  substantial  progress  was made toward the 
main program objectives but more time was  allowed  for the adjustment 
effort. The 70 arrangements  that were  canceled  early but were  followed 
promptly  by a successor  arrangement  are most  likely cases where  weak 
policy implementation  or large unforeseen  shocks rendered unattainable 
the original program objectives, but where it was possible  to reach under- 
standings  fairly rapidly on a new  adjustment  blueprint.  The 44 arrange- 
ments  that were canceled  before their expiration date and were not soon 
followed  by  a new  arrangement,  represent  mainly  a subset  of the pro- 
grams that went  permanently  off track during the monitoring  phase. 
Completion  of an IMF arrangement  does  not  usually  imply  that the 
numerical  targets for the main economic  objectives  of the country's  pro- 
gram originally approved  by the Executive Board were met.  Completion 
does  not even  ensure  that the country  met the revised  numerical  targets 
agreed  on at the last program review.  Completion  of an IMF-supported 
program does  imply that, in the IMF's view,  the country made  substan- 
tial and satisfactory progress  toward the primary objectives  of its adjust- 
ment program (especially  toward external viability),  and that the policies 
of  the  authorities  were  broadly  in line  with  the  (often  revised)  under- 
standings  reached with  the IMF during the life of the arrangement. 
The relationship  between  the IMF and the borrowing  country follow- 
ing  completion  of a Fund arrangement  generally  depends  on the prog- 
ress  in  eliminating  the  macroeconomic  and  structural  imbalances  that 
gave  rise to the expiring  IMF program and on the external environment Table 3  DURATION OF IMF ARRANGEMENTS 
Early cancellations 
Program  extensions  Length of 
Original  Extension  cancelled  o.w.: followed 
duration  length  Number  segment  by successor 
Number of  (average,  Number of  (average,  of early  (average,  arrangement 
arrangements  in months)  extensions  in months)  cancellations  in months)  (no. of arrangements)a 
By type of arrangement  (1973-1997): 
Standby  441  13.8  33  5.3  63  2.2  43 
Extended  Fund facility  63  29.3  7  16.2  28  9.7  16 
SAF  38  30.7  2  9.3  10  9.9  10 
ESAF  73  40.0  31  6.5  13  5.2  1 
Total  615  73  114  70 
By subperiod  (all arrangements): 
1973-77  85  12.4  --  7  3.9  7 
1978-82  124  15.2  -  -  36  1.0  26 
1983-87  139  17.8  10  1.0  28  1.9  13 
1988-92  126  24.7  38  13.2  14  8.1  13 
1993-97  141  24.6  25  9.7  29  0.8  11 
Source:  IMF, Tranactions  of the Fund (1998). 
aSuccessor arrangement  approved  up to one month  following  the cancellation  of a prior arrangement. 98 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
at the time  of completion.  When  progress  has been  substantial  and the 
external environment  is not seen  as a threat, monitoring  of the country's 
performance  usually  reverts to the preprogram  mode-i.e.,  to IMF sur- 
veillance.  When  conditions  are less  favorable  the  country  authorities 
may  request  a successor  arrangement  to help  consolidate  the  (partial) 
gains from the previous  program. Because of the recurrent nature of the 
shocks affecting many members  and the gravity of their structural imbal- 
ances,  such requests  are not uncommon  (see Table 1, lower panel).  Typi- 
cally, a successor  arrangement  will have a medium-term  orientation  and 
a  goal  of  deepening  structural  reforms  initiated  during  the  previous 
program.  The  authorities'  request  for a successor  arrangement  sets  in 
motion  a multistaged  process  very similar to that followed  in their prior 
request  for IMF support. 
3.  The  Economics  of  IMF-Supported  Programs 
3.1 CORE  COMPONENTS 
Despite  differences  imparted  to IMF programs by country-specific  char- 
acteristics,  blueprints  of adjustment  prepared  by Fund staff contain  im- 
portant common  elements.  These elements  are closely  linked to the IMF 
mandate  established  in the Articles of Agreement,  and range from eligi- 
bility  criteria for securing  access  to IMF resources-i.e.,  a situation  of 
actual  or potential  balance-of-payments  need-to  priority  in  the  pro- 
grams for orderly restoration of external viability (see Guitiin,  1995). In 
their practical application  over time,  these  common  elements  have  pro- 
duced  a  three-pronged  approach  for  confronting  external  payments 
problems:  (1) securing  sustainable  external  financing;  (2) adoption  of 
demand-restraining  measures-especially  in  the  early  stages  of  a pro- 
gram; and  (3) implementation  of structural reforms (see Schadler et al., 
1995). The relative  importance  of those  components  depends  crucially 
on the specific circumstances  of the member country. The blueprint  for a 
country  whose  international  reserves  are depleted  as a result of unsus- 
tainable fiscal imbalances  will place considerably  more (initial) emphasis 
on demand-restraining  measures  than that for a country whose  balance 
of payments  was  adversely  affected  by  external  shocks.  Likewise,  the 
blueprints  for countries  with  less  pressing  balance-of-payments  prob- 
lems  often  place  more  emphasis  on  structural  measures  aimed  at has- 
tening  the pace of output  growth. 
Care should  be taken, however,  not to exaggerate  the degree of substi- 
tutability among the three core components  of the approach. In the midst 
of an external payments  crisis the scope for, say, relying more heavily  on 
additional  external financing  than on restraint of aggregate  demand,  or The  IMF  Approach  to Economic  Stabilization  *  99 
for further delaying  structural reforms  likely  to have  a bearing  on  the 
success  of the stabilization  program, is usually  quite limited.  Hence,  it is 
often  more  appropriate  to regard the  three  components  of the  general 
IMF approach  to  economic  stabilization  as complements,  especially  in 
the  early stages  of a program.  As  noted,  once  the  crisis has  been  con- 
tained  and confidence  restored,  external financing  constraints  often be- 
come  less  pressing  and  the  macroeconomic  policy  stance  can become 
more  supportive  of  domestic  demand  and  of  structural  reforms.  It 
should  be stressed,  however,  that the role of the IMF is to contribute  to 
design  the adjustment  strategy, help the country  secure external financ- 
ing,  and monitor the progress  in overcoming  the external crisis, but that 
it is up to the country's  authorities to implement  in a timely and credible 
manner the policy measures  contemplated  in the strategy. 
The availability of external financing,  the first component  of the strat- 
egy,  determines  the  magnitude  and  pace  of  the  necessary  adjustment 
effort. The amount  and terms of the new  foreign borrowing  obtainable 
by  a  country  experiencing  balance-of-payments  problems  are  largely 
predetermined-and  typically  scarce and  onerous-at  the  outset  of  a 
program. Hence,  in practice, there is little scope for treating the prospec- 
tive external financing  from official and private lenders  as a "slack vari- 
able" when  preparing  the blueprint  of the adjustment  program,  as has 
been  suggested  by  some  IMF critics (e.g.,  Killick, 1995, and  Harrigan, 
1996). Financial support  from the Fund,  of course,  can help  reduce  the 
country's  financing  gap  for  a limited  period.  However,  limits  on  the 
Fund's  resources-limits  which  the membership  establishes  as reason- 
able and prudent  in view  of the IMF's mandate  and which  place upper 
bounds  on IMF support  to individual  countries6-significantly  constrain 
the extent  to which  the Fund can substitute  for other sources  of financ- 
ing. Indeed,  in the large financial support packages  arranged for Mexico 
in  1995 and  for Thailand,  Indonesia,  and  Korea in  1997, the  IMF pro- 
vided  less  than half the announced  funding,  with  the rest being  prom- 
ised by the World Bank, the regional  development  banks,  and bilateral 
sources.  And  notwithstanding  these  exceptionally  large  packages,  the 
four countries  nonetheless  had  to make large and rapid adjustments  to 
meet the pressures  of their external financing  constraint. 
Precisely  because  the  external  financing  constraint  is  often  severe, 
Fund-supported  programs  aim  at  restoring  the  country's  access  to  a 
sustainable  flow  of  foreign  financing  as  rapidly  as  possible.  Gauging 
that sustainable  flow,  as well  as the  time  it may  take to  secure  it,  is a 
6. For a discussion  of the  access  limits  applicable  to the  various  IMF facilities  and of the 
criteria regulating  access  by  individual  member  countries  see  International  Monetary 
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matter of judgement.  General conditions  in international  financial mar- 
kets  and those  specific  to the program  country  (the level,  composition, 
and  maturity  of  its  external  liabilities,  its  debt  service  profile,  and  its 
access  to private  capital markets) play  an important  role.  Of necessity, 
however,  the  estimates  of  net  external  financing  incorporated  in  the 
(initial)  adjustment  program  are tentative,  are subject  to  considerable 
uncertainty,  and  undergo  significant  revisions  over  the  course  of  an 
arrangement.  That uncertainty  is  much  higher  in countries  where  the 
lion's  share  of  foreign  borrowing  is  undertaken  by  the  private  sector 
(including  private banks),  a situation  that has become  increasingly  com- 
mon  in the 1990s. 
The  main  guidelines  of  the  approach  followed  by  IMF staff  when 
gauging  the  prospective  external  financing  date back  several  decades, 
but have been  applied  more systematically  and uniformly  since the debt 
crisis  of the  1980s (see  Finch,  1989). Those  guidelines  require that the 
country  not show  an ex ante external  financing  gap,  that it remain cur- 
rent  in  its  debt  service  commitments,  and  (with  some  exceptions  in 
special circumstances)  that it eliminate  external debt arrears it may have 
accumulated  prior to the program  approval.  In practice,  the guidelines 
require  the  staff  to  produce  "reasonable"  estimates  of  net  financing 
flows  from  official  and  private  sources,  and  to assume  a coordinating 
role with the country's creditors in various fora-i.e.,  the Paris Club, the 
London  Club,  and  special  consultative  groups  of  donors.  This  "con- 
certed lending  approach"-which  required several  modifications  to the 
Fund's  guidelines  on foreign  borrowing,  notably  the policy  of financing 
assurances7-proved  instrumental  in dealing  with  the  debt  crisis of the 
1980s,  and  continues  to be  useful  for countries  with  limited  access  to 
private  capital markets.  However,  the  concerted  approach  has  proved 
less useful for dealing  with the complex  external debt problems posed by 
a more  diversified  set  of lenders  and borrowers  in countries  with  rela- 
tively  unrestricted  access  to  global  capital  markets-for  example,  for 
producing  "reasonable" forecasts of redemption  rates of domestic  bonds 
and equities  or of rollover  rates of foreign  credit lines  to private-sector 
borrowers.  Recent  experience  with  these  problems  has  generated  calls 
for more effective ways  of involving  the private sector in forestalling  and 
ameliorating  financial crises,  but no  comprehensive  solution,  such  as a 
world  bankruptcy court, seems  likely in the near future. 
7. The policy  of financing  assurances  reduced  the Fund programs'  reliance on judgmental 
estimates  of  voluntary  financing  from  foreign  creditors-which  often  failed  to 
materialize-and  made the securing  of a critical mass of commitments  of external assis- 
tance  from  the  country's  creditors  a prerequisite  for an  IMF arrangement  (see  Polak, 
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Demand-restraining  measures,  the  second  component  of  the  ap- 
proach,  comprise  the  macroeconomic  policies  that  seek  to  restore  and 
preserve  viable  equilibrium  between  aggregate  expenditure  and  aggre- 
gate  income  in the program  country. These  measures  are probably  the 
best-known  ingredient  of  IMF-supported  programs,  and  are typically 
regarded  as the cornerstone  of the "traditional IMF package."8 The mea- 
sures normally  contemplate  a tightening  of fiscal and monetary  policies 
by an amount  deemed  necessary  to bring aggregate  demand  in line with 
the staff's  estimates  of prospective  output  and available external financ- 
ing and,  hence,  with  a sustainable  current account.  Sometimes,  though 
not  as  often  as  is  commonly  thought,  the  measures  also  contemplate 
changes  in the (level or rate of crawl of the) nominal  exchange  rate as a 
means  to facilitate external adjustment. 
Conceptually,  ascribing to fiscal and monetary  policies  the key task of 
restoring  and  preserving  viable  external balance  can be  readily  under- 
stood  in terms of a large class of theoretical models  based  on,  or consis- 
tent with,  the absorption  approach-e.g.,  the dependent-economy  model, 
the Mundell-Fleming  model,  and the monetary  approach to the balance 
of payments.9  In this regard, the macroeconomic  policies  normally  rec- 
ommended  by  the  IMF are not  significantly  different  from what  most 
economists  would  recommend  to countries  experiencing  severe balance- 
of-payments  problems,  allowing  for differences  over the specific advice 
in particular situations.10 This is especially  so when  a large fiscal imbal- 
ance and/or excessively  rapid credit expansion  are at the heart of a coun- 
try's balance-of-payments  difficulties,  and  when  a large  exchange-rate 
devaluation  or the adoption  of an unfettered  floating-rate regime are not 
seen  as desirable means for adjusting  the external payments  position.  In 
contrast, as in the recent Asian crisis, when  an unsustainable  fiscal posi- 
tion is not the main underlying  problem,  but a loss  of confidence  com- 
bined  with  domestic  financial  weaknesses  induces  sudden  reversals  of 
8. This characterization  can be found in numerous  studies and accounts  of IMF  programs. 
See, for example, Edwards  (1989),  Killick  (1995),  and Feldstein  (1998). 
9. The absorption  approach  is discussed  in (almost)  every textbook  of international  econom- 
ics. The interested  reader  is referred  to the seminal  article  by Alexander  (1952)  and to the 
insightful (and complementary)  presentations  of the approach  in Kenen (1985),  Interna- 
tional Monetary  Fund (1987),  Buiter  (1990),  and Cooper (1992). 
10. In this connection, the well-known (and often cited) conclusion reached by Richard 
Cooper  at a 1982  conference  on IMF  conditionality,  namely,  that any five people chosen 
randomly  from  the diverse group of participants  at the conference  would, if confronted 
with an external  crisis from a position of authority,  produce an adjustment  program  "that  would not differ greatly from a typical IMF  program,"  seems as pertinent and 
valid today as it was then (see Williamson, 1983). The assessment of the Fund's 
macroeconomic  advice in a recent survey article  by Anne Krueger (Krueger,  1998), 
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capital flows  and domestic  capital flight,  leading  to a currency  crash, the 
macroeconomic  policy  emphasis  should  not  be  on  tighter  fiscal  policy 
but on a temporary  tightening  of monetary  policy.  Although  controver- 
sial,  a  monetary  tightening  in  those  circumstances  would  help  resist 
massive  currency depreciations  that themselves  tend to crush the domes- 
tic economy  and induce  a huge  turnaround  in the current account. 
The third component  of the general  framework  in the design  of IMF- 
supported  programs  is the understandings  on structural reforms. These 
comprise  all types  of policies  aimed  at reducing  government-imposed 
distortions  and other structural and institutional  rigidities that impair an 
efficient allocation  of resources  in the economy  and hinder  growth.  The 
reforms  cover  a  wide  spectrum  of  activities  beyond  the  domain  of 
macroeconomic  policy,  including  measures  related  to  trade  liberaliza- 
tion,  price  liberalization,  foreign  exchange  market  reform,  tax reform, 
government  spending  reform,  privatization,  pension  reform,  financial- 
sector  reform, banking  system  restructuring,  labor-market reform,  and 
the strengthening  of social  safety  nets.1  Moreover,  in many  cases,  and 
increasingly  so in recent years, Fund arrangements  are designed  in close 
coordination with programs of the World Bank and/or the regional devel- 
opment  banks.12 As  a result,  the  conditionality  on structural aspects  of 
IMF-supported  programs  often relates to issues  that are under the more 
direct  purview  of  other  international  financial  institutions,  but  are in- 
cluded  in the Fund arrangement  to give  a comprehensive  picture of the 
reform effort. 
Of course,  the  specific  structural reform content  in any  arrangement 
depends  on the characteristics and circumstances  of the country request- 
ing IMF support.  One  reason  for this is the wide  differences  in levels  of 
income  and stage  of development  among  member  countries.  For exam- 
ple,  in the Asian crisis, the structural reform content of Fund-supported 
programs  focused  particularly on the financial sector because  this was  a 
critical problem  area (Lane et al.,  1999); in the arrangements  for transi- 
tion economies,  privatization  and the building  of basic institutions  of a 
market economy  were key structural priorities (de Melo et al., 1996); and 
arrangements  under  the ESAF normally  attach structural conditionality 
on a number of areas where  distortions  are particularly damaging  (Inter- 
national  Monetary  Fund,  1997). Growing  emphasis  on structural issues 
11. For general  discussions  of the rationale for structural reforms see  International Mone- 
tary Fund (1987), Williamson  (1990), and Krueger (1993). For an overview  of the record 
on structural reforms in recent Fund arrangements  see Schadler et al. (1995) and Inter- 
national  Monetary Fund (1997). 
12. This  happens  not  only  for  arrangements  under  the  ESAF (the  Fund's  concessional 
facility for low-income  countries),  where  such coordination  is formally required, but for 
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in IMF-supported  programs  also reflects the (not so linear) evolution  of 
the  profession's  views  about  the  prerequisites  for  a  well-functioning 
market  economy.13 Moreover,  structural  reforms  differ  from  the  other 
core components  of IMF programs in the difficulties for monitoring prog- 
ress  in  implementation,  in  their  long  gestation  periods,  and  in  their 
particularly  strong  political-economy  ramifications.  The  confluence  of 
these  factors has  resulted  in a gradual but steady  rise in the structural- 
reform content  of IMF programs,  a trend  that has  sparked  strong,  but 
often disparate,  criticisms from many quarters.14 
3.2 CRITICISMS  OF THE  IMF  APPROACH 
There is no shortage  of criticisms of the basic IMF approach,  some  many 
years old,  others  relatively new.  Some  focus  on one  of the core compo- 
nents  of the  approach,  others  take issue  with  all of them.  Not  surpris- 
ingly,  the  number,  diversity,  and  intensity  of  the  criticisms  increase 
when  the international  financial system  faces a crisis, as with  the break- 
down  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  the  debt  crisis  of  the  1980s,  the 
collapse  of the centrally  planned  economies  of Eastern Europe and the 
(former) Soviet Union,  and,  most recently, the financial crises in Mexico 
and Asia. 
A  driving  force  behind  most  criticisms  of  the  IMF approach  is  the 
visible disjunction between  its  three  core  elements  and  what  virtually 
everyone  sees  as the  desirable  objectives  of economic  policy.  As noted 
before,  those  objectives  normally  include  a high  rate of  growth  and  a 
low rate of inflation,  alleviating  poverty  and avoiding  social unrest,  and 
ensuring  an  adequate  supply  of public  goods.  These  broad  objectives 
are relevant for program design  (in terms of what should  be achieved  in 
the medium  and long term), and so is the goal of minimizing  damage  to 
the international  community  from a balance-of-payments  adjustment  in 
any given  country. But it cannot reasonably  be argued  that the immedi- 
ate effect  of IMF-supported  programs  is (or should  be) always  positive 
in  all  the  desirable  dimensions  of  economic  policy  and  performance. 
Economic adjustment  and reform are costly and difficult endeavors,  and 
especially  so  in  the  crisis  or near-crisis  conditions  in  which  member 
countries  normally  come  to the Fund to request  support  (see  Santaella, 
1996). In those  circumstances,  there will generally be no quick and easy 
13. Compare,  for instance,  the structural reform policies  discussed  in International Mone- 
tary Fund (1987) and Williamson  (1990) with  those  stressed  by Williamson  (1994) and 
Burki and Perry (1998). 
14. Polak (1991) and Killick (1995) document  the increase in the structural-reform content 
of IMF programs;  see  also Schadler et al. (1995), International  Monetary  Fund  (1997), 
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solutions  that  will  make  everyone  everywhere  feel  a  lot  better  both 
immediately  and forever after. 
A (slight) variation  of this general criticism is the view  that the macro- 
economics  underlying  the IMF approach to stabilization  is fundamentally 
wrong.  This is the position  taken, often without  much analysis, by many 
critics of the Fund in several nongovernmental  organizations  and in the 
popular press. Some academics,  such as Lance Taylor and other neostruc- 
turalists (Taylor, 1988, 1993), also advance this criticism. In response,  one 
should  stress that any country experiencing  severe balance-of-payments 
difficulties and a shortage of external financing must, eventually,  confront 
and  redress  its aggregate  imbalances.  This in turn generally  requires  a 
contraction  of domestic  spending,  usually  facilitated  by a tightening  of 
fiscal and monetary  policies;  in addition,  when  external disequilibria are 
large, a real depreciation  of the currency may be needed.  The analytical 
and  empirical  support  for these  basic  facts  of economic  adjustment  is 
overwhelming.  To be sure,  there are serious  issues  concerning  whether, 
in  specific  cases,  the  policies  recommended  by  IMF staff  are the  most 
appropriate,  taking account of all of the relevant circumstances  and con- 
straints; these issues  deserve  to be debated,  and it should not be expected 
that the professional  consensus  will always be that the Fund got it exactly 
right.  But it is simply  wishful  thinking  to believe  that there generally is 
some  better and easier way  to secure,  or avoid,  macroeconomic  adjust- 
ment  in the midst  of an external payments  crisis. 
Another  common  criticism stems  from the belief  that IMF-supported 
programs not only contain the same type of policy recommendations,  but 
that  they  actually  contemplate  an  adjustment  of  (approximately)  the 
same  size for all countries.  This perception  is surprisingly  widespread, 
even  among  academics,  but  is  also  absolutely  false.  As  noted  before, 
every  cross-country  analysis  of the experience  with  IMF-supported  pro- 
grams,  conducted  either by IMF staff or by outsiders,  shows  unequivo- 
cally that the  size  of the  adjustment  in  those  programs-as  measured 
by the projected  decline  in the fiscal deficit, the projected improvement 
in  the  external  current  account,  or  the  projected  fall  in  the  rate  of 
inflation-varies  considerably  across  programs  and  is,  by  and  large,  a 
monotonic  function  of the size of the (preexisting  or prospective)  imbal- 
ances.15 For example,  in several  of the debt-crisis  countries  of the 1980s, 
massive  and unsustainable  fiscal deficits were major problems  and lay at 
the heart of balance-of-payments  difficulties  and chronic inflation; objec- 
15. For evidence  on this point  see  the references  cited  in footnote  1; see  also Lane et al., 
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tives  for fiscal consolidation  in Fund-supported  programs,  correspond- 
ingly, had to be very ambitious.  This was much less so for the programs 
with Mexico and Argentina  in the tequila crisis and for those  with  Indo- 
nesia and Korea in the Asian crisis, but was again a more critical issue in 
recent arrangements  with  Russia and Brazil. 
Other  criticisms  take  issue  with  the  structural-reform  component  of 
Fund-supported  programs.  Here,  the  focus  has  shifted  over  time; 
whereas  the debates  in the 1980s revolved  around IMF conditionality  in 
trade reform, exchange-rate  unification,  and interest-rate  liberalization, 
those  of the 1990s have dealt mostly  with privatization,  pension  reform, 
and,  most recently, capital-account  convertibility  and banking-sector  re- 
form. There are, however,  common  themes  to the criticisms.  Prominent 
are those  related  to  the  "ownership"  of  the  reforms;  the  horizon,  se- 
quence,  and pace of their implementation  (especially  as they are seen  as 
conflicting with the relatively short duration of Fund arrangements); and 
the  lack of expertise,  and  mandate,  of Fund  staff to impart advice  and 
design  conditionality  on  structural  issues.16 We believe  that it is perti- 
nent to highlight  two facts often forgotten in discussions  of these issues: 
First, the  inclusion  of  structural  reforms  in Fund-supported  programs 
was  largely  a  response  to  requests  from  the  IMF membership  for  a 
broadening  of the scope  (and duration)  of Fund arrangements  to make 
them  more  suitable  for  tackling  structural  impediments  to  sustained 
growth  and  external  viability  (see  International  Monetary  Fund,  1987, 
and  Polak,  1991). Second,  Fund condionality  typically  takes account  of 
the difficulties  and delays inherent in a process  of structural adjustment, 
most  notably  by monitoring  "progress" in these  areas, mostly  through 
periodical  assessments  of  the  authorities'  willingness  and  (oftentimes 
constrained)  capacity  to comply  with  specific  measures,  rather than in 
terms  of the  realization  of the benefits  expected  from full implementa- 
tion of the reforms. 
Yet another  strand of criticisms  questions  whether  the intellectual  doc- 
trine underlying  Fund-supported  programs  is sufficiently  responsive  to 
changing  conditions  in the global economy  and the evolution  of profes- 
sional thinking.  Specifically, in dealing  with  the collapse  of the centrally 
planned  economies  of Eastern Europe and the (former) Soviet Union,  and 
with  the financial crises of Mexico in 1995 and Thailand,  Indonesia,  and 
Korea in  1997-1998,  many  critics argued  that the  "traditional IMF ap- 
proach" was ill suited for the (widely  different) challenges posed  by these 
16. Recent  studies  by  Killick (1995), Calomiris  (1998), Feldstein  (1998), and James (1998) 
discuss  these  themes  in some  length.  For earlier criticisms  see  Group of Twenty-Four 
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fundamentally  new  types  of problems.17 That the IMF approach to these 
recent problems  was  in fact quite  different  from earlier IMF-supported 
programs seems  to have escaped  notice.  For example,  the Fund arrange- 
ments  for Mexico during the debt crisis of the 1980s consisted  mostly  of 
sizable  fiscal adjustments,  modest  official financing,  and concerted  roll- 
over of commercial bank credits, whereas  the 1995-1996  standby arrange- 
ment involved  modest  fiscal adjustment  and very large official financing. 
The  controversy  about  the  recent  Fund  arrangements  for Thailand, 
Indonesia,  and  Korea  is  a prime  example  of  the  accusation  that  IMF 
programs are based on a misguided  and dogmatic approach to macroeco- 
nomic stabilization.  Interestingly,  given other differences  among the crit- 
ics,  a sort  of consensus  emerged  that  the  fiscal and  monetary  policies 
recommended-or,  as some  critics prefer to say, imposed-by  the Fund 
in those countries was "too tight." For fiscal policy, as documented  in the 
study  by  Lane et al.  (1999) and  in the  IMF's World  Economic Outlook of 
December  1997 and  May  1998,  the  adjustment  called  for in  the  initial 
programs was  fairly small for Indonesia  and Korea, and was  moderate, 
by Fund  standards,  for Thailand.  The economic  assumptions  for these 
initial  programs-which  the  authorities  were  reluctant  to  see  down- 
graded-envisioned  slower  but still significantly  positive  growth  for all 
three countries  in both  1997 and 1998 and contemplated  only moderate 
exchange-rate  depreciations.  Under these  assumptions,  the initial fiscal 
policy  prescriptions  were  reasonable  and were  accepted  as such  by the 
authorities.  For Thailand, which  entered the crisis with a current account 
deficit of 8% of GDP (much larger than the current-account  imbalances 
of Indonesia  or Korea), a larger fiscal effort seemed  appropriate.  As  it 
became  clear, to the  Fund  and  everyone  else,  that the  crises  would  be 
much  deeper  than  originally  expected,  programs  were  revised  and 
prescriptions  for fiscal policy  shifted  from small or moderate  restraint to 
significant  stimulus,  including  the  provision  of social  safety  nets.  This 
shift  did  not  involve  a  change  in  Fund  dogma,  but  rather  a  normal 
application  of the flexibility to respond  to unforeseen  events  embedded 
in the process  described  in Section 2. 
17. Developments  in the Asian  and subsequent  emerging  market crises of 1997-1998  have 
given  rise  to  a broad  debate  about  reforming  the  "architecture" of  the  interational 
monetary  and financial system; see Eichengreen  (1999) for an excellent overview  of the 
issues.  See also Minton-Beddoes  (1995), Calomiris (1998), Krueger (1998), and Folkerts- 
Landau  and Garber (1999). Although  most  of the issues  in this debate  do not  directly 
concern  the  subject  matter  of  this  paper-the  Fund's  approach  to  economic 
stabilization-it  is interesting  that many  of the reform proposals  that do touch on this 
subject run counter to many criticisms of Fund conditionality.  In particular, suggestions 
for reform generally push for less financing  from the Fund and/or stricter conditionality 
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In the  case  of monetary  policy,  the IMF advice  at the outset  of those 
programs  stressed  the need  for a significant  initial and temporary tight- 
ening  to  arrest  excessive  exchange-rate  depreciations  that  threatened 
both an acceleration of domestic  inflation and the spread of contagion  to 
other countries.  Some prominent  economists  have argued that the weak 
financial  systems  and  faltering  domestic  demand  in  those  economies 
called  for an easing  rather than  a tightening  of monetary  policy;  some 
have  even  suggested  that an easier monetary  policy would  have led to a 
nominal  appreciation  of  those  currencies.  Clearly  there  are  circum- 
stances where  the tightening  of monetary  policy  to resist some  (perhaps 
significant)  exchange-rate  depreciation  is not desirable,  for example,  af- 
ter the  United  Kingdom  exited  from the  Exchange  Rate Mechanism  in 
September  1992 or for Singapore  and  China  in  1997-1998.  Also,  even 
when  monetary  tightening  is appropriate  to resist massive  and unwar- 
ranted exchange-rate  depreciations,  the  "right" degree  and duration  of 
monetary  tightening  is  a  difficult  issue  of  judgement.  Nevertheless, 
when  a currency  suddenly  loses  half  its  value  amidst  massive  capital 
outflows  and collapsing  confidence,  as was  the case  for Indonesia,  Ko- 
rea,  and  Thailand,  monetary  easing  is not  a sensible  policy,  and  some 
significant  temporary tightening  is generally  warranted. The ill effects of 
high  interest  rates  on  a weak  economy  and  a fragile  financial  system 
must be weighed  against the probable consequences  of a large deprecia- 
tion on the burden of foreign-currency  indebtedness  and on the unleash- 
ing of inflationary pressures. 
In fact,  in  Thailand  and  Korea,  where  the  IMF advice  on  monetary 
policy  was  followed  after some  initial hesitation,  exchange  rates were 
stabilized  and  subsequently  recovered  to  more  reasonable  levels,  and 
nominal  interest  rates  were  then  progressively  reduced  to below  pre- 
crisis  levels.  There  was  nothing  bizarre  in  these  cases  suggesting  a 
perverse  relationship  between  monetary  policy  and  the  exchange  rate; 
the behavior  observed  followed  the  pattern  seen  in earlier episodes  of 
severe  exchange-rate  pressures,  such  as  Mexico  in  1995 or the  Czech 
Republic in 1997 (see Lane et al.,  1999, Chapter 6). In Indonesia,  mone- 
tary policy was tightened  only briefly before massive  injections of liquid- 
ity  to banks  facing  deposit  runs,  along  with  policy  switches,  political 
uncertainty,  and social unrest,  led to a massive  80% depreciation  of the 
rupiah  and  to  widespread  default  on  private-sector  debts.  Again,  the 
pattern  was  what  one  would  expect  from  the  large  body  of empirical 
evidence  on  the  relation  between  monetary  policy  and  the  exchange 
rate. All things  considered,  the  notion  that in the context  of the Asian 
crisis  easings  of  monetary  policy  would  have  induced  exchange-rate 
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3.3 WHY  FUND PROGRAMS  TEND  TO LOOK  ALIKE 
Although  many  criticisms  of the  Fund lack a firm basis,  there  remains 
the  impression  that the  IMF approach  to  economic  stabilization  is too 
rigid  and  dogmatic  to  accommodate  the  differing  and  changing  cir- 
cumstances  of  member  countries  that  encounter  balance-of-payments 
difficulties.  This impression  is not entirely without  foundation.  The IMF 
is  a highly  disciplined  bureaucracy  that  operates  in  accord  with  well- 
established,  and only  gradually  evolving,  policies  and procedures.  Key 
IMF staff involved  in program  operations  typically  have  long  tenure  in 
the Fund.  There is a legal  framework  for IMF operations,  based  on the 
Articles  of Agreement  and  established  policies  of the  Executive  Board, 
which  imposes  constraints on what is and what is not acceptable in Fund 
arrangements.  All of this  imparts  a degree  of conservatism  to the  IMF 
approach  which  is both  bad  and  good.  Bad because  it implies  a lesser 
degree  of  flexibility  in Fund  conditionality  than  would  be  desirable  in 
some  ideal  world.  Good  because  IMF members  that may wish  to make 
use  of  the  Fund's  resources  or members  who  may  be  called  upon  to 
supply  those  resources  have  expressed  a desire  to  have  a reasonable 
understanding  of the circumstances,  conditions,  and terms under which 
IMF financing  may be made  available.  There must be reasonable  assur- 
ance of equality  of treatment; members  encountering  similar balance-of- 
payments  problems  and  willing  to undertake  similar adjustment  mea- 
sures  should  have  similar access  to Fund resources.  The IMF cannot act 
with  unbridled  discretion.  As with  any powerful  institution,  there is an 
unavoidable  tension  between  giving  to  (and  asking  from) the  IMF too 
much  or too little flexibility. 
The general  impression  of inflexibility  in the Fund's  actions,  policies, 
and doctrine,  however,  is seriously  exaggerated,  in part because  of the 
way  in  which  the  IMF has  described  its  own  activities.  When  Fund 
arrangements  are announced  (or leaked)  to the  public,  they  appear  to 
present  a rigid blueprint  for a country's  economic  policies  and for their 
expected  results, including  numerical performance criteria for key macro- 
economic  aggregates.  All  arrangements  contain  numerical  targets  for 
output  growth,  the  inflation  rate,  and  the  current  account  for one  to 
three years  ahead; and  all contain  quantitative  performance  criteria for 
fiscal  and  monetary  policy  variables,  usually  for  quarterly  test  dates 
covering the first six to twelve  months  of the arrangement.18 The natural, 
but  incorrect,  perception  for many  outsiders  is  that if the  quantitative 
18. Interestingly,  numerical  performance  criteria were  not  always  a component  of  Fund 
arrangements,  and their general  adoption  in the 1960s was  in large part a response  to 
the  borrowing countries' demand  for more  predictability  in the  access  to the  (phased) 
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criteria are  met,  the  program  is  on  track  and  disbursements  of  IMF 
resources  continue,  whereas  if the criteria are not met, the program is off 
track and disbursements  cease.  The flexible process  described  in Section 
2, with the possibility  of waivers  or modifications  of performance criteria 
or  of  revisions  and  renegotiations  of  the  adjustment  blueprint  to 
strengthen  policy  actions  and minimize  the interruptions  to the flow  of 
Fund disbursements,  is not normally presented  or perceived  as an inte- 
gral part of IMF arrangements-even  though  the member and the Fund 
fully understand  these possibilities. 
The impression  of unreasonable  uniformity  in the macroeconomic  con- 
ditionality  of  Fund-supported  programs  is  reinforced  by  the  apparent 
similarity  in  the  numerical  performance  criteria in  the  critical areas of 
fiscal and monetary policy. Specifically, the main fiscal performance crite- 
rion in Fund  arrangements  is normally  specified  as (quarterly) ceilings 
on the nominal  value  of the fiscal deficit or on the portion  of that deficit 
financed  with  domestic  credit.19  For monetary policy, performance  crite- 
ria are typically  specified  as (quarterly) ceilings  on the expansion  of net 
domestic  credit of the central bank and as (quarterly) floors on net inter- 
national  reserves  (see Guitian,  1994). 
On the substance  of these performance criteria, it is straightforward  to 
see  why  an upper  limit  on  the  fiscal deficit  (or on  credit to finance  it) 
should  generally  be  an  element  of  IMF conditionality.  For a  country 
facing  balance-of-payments  difficulties,  external  credit  to  the  govern- 
ment  (as well  as  to  the  private  sector)  is  usually  tightly  constrained. 
Resort  to  domestic  credit  to  finance  the  government  also  has  limits, 
particularly when  credit conditions  are tight and when  additional mone- 
tary financing  to the public sector (from the central bank or the banking 
system)  may unleash  inflationary pressures.  Furthermore, in many cases 
a tightened  fiscal stance is important, even central, to assist in redressing 
imbalances  in  the  external  current  account.  Of  course,  the  degree  of 
fiscal tightening  should  and  does  vary  greatly  across  individual  cases, 
depending  not just on the size of the initial fiscal disequilibrium  but also 
on the  (expected)  availability of sustainable  and noninflationary  means 
of  deficit  financing.  Mistakes  in  setting  fiscal  targets  will  be  made  in 
individual  cases,  especially  when  the key assumptions  on which  a pro- 
gram is based  are falsified by actual developments.  But this cannot  rea- 
sonably be an argument  that Fund arrangements  should  refrain from an 
explicit  requirement  for fiscal restraint,  especially  considering  that the 
arrangements  place more emphasis  on the adoption  of policy  measures 
that appear  necessary  to redress  the  existing  fiscal  imbalance  than  on 
19. The rationale for this specification  is explained  in Tanzi (1987) and Guitian (1995). 110 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
attaining  a given  deficit  target.  By and  large,  if the  measures  adopted 
are judged  appropriate but the bottom  line is missed  for reasons beyond 
the  authorities'  control,  compliance  with  fiscal  conditionality  is  often 
granted,  provided  that performance  in other areas remains  satisfactory. 
While the rationale for fiscal conditionality  may be recognized,  greater 
controversy  surrounds  monetary-policy  conditionality,  especially  the 
standard  procedure  of  specifying  quarterly  quantitative  targets  on  do- 
mestic credit and on the stock of net international  reserves.  The concep- 
tual  basis  for  this  procedure  is  perceived  to  be  deeply  rooted  in  the 
monetary  approach  to the balance  of payments,  a theory  of the adjust- 
ment  process  in an open  economy  that IMF staff contributed  to devel- 
oping.20  Much  criticism  of  IMF prescriptions  for  monetary  policy  in 
program  countries  has  centered  on  the  theoretical  underpinnings  and 
empirical validity  of the monetary  approach  to the balance  of payments 
and, in particular, of the "Polak model."  Specifically, critics have empha- 
sized the large body  of evidence  that documents  the pervasive  instability 
of money  demand  and the poor performance  of operational  frameworks 
for monetary  policy  that depends  on targeting  of monetary  aggregates, 
especially  over  the short horizons  used  for setting  performance  criteria 
in  Fund  arrangements.21 Notwithstanding  these  criticisms,  the  specifi- 
cation  of  monetary  policy  in  IMF-supported  programs  has  remained 
essentially  unaltered.  Until recently, the  few justifications  for this resil- 
ience  that were  given  by Fund staff consisted  either of highlighting  the 
"encompassing  character" of the monetary  approach22  or of restating the 
"strong association  that is known  to exist between  an excess  of domestic 
credit  and  an  excess  of  aggregate  spending  over  aggregate  income." 
With some basis,  those arguments  were regarded by critics as symptoms 
of denial  and dogmatism.23 Nonetheless,  when  account is taken both of 
20. The studies  by Polak (1957) and Prais (1961) are widely  regarded as modern  precursors 
of the  monetary  approach,  a theory  that was  further formalized  and brought  to the 
forefront  of  the  academic  debate  by  a  group  of  economists  from  the  University  of 
Chicago  in the 1970s. See Frenkel and Johnson  (1976); see also Intemational  Monetary 
Fund (1977). 
21. For these  and other critiques to the (alleged)  reliance of Fund programs  on the mone- 
tary  approach  to  the  balance  of  payments  see  Dell  (1982),  Taylor  (1988),  Edwards 
(1989), Dornbusch  (1991), Jager (1994), and Killick (1995). 
22. For example,  when  discussing  the  design  of monetary  policy  in Fund-supported  pro- 
grams, International Monetary Fund (1987) states that "[the monetary] approach can be 
considered  a relatively  general theory of long-run behavior  that encompasses  a variety 
of models  of short-term adjustment.  The fundamental  equation  ...  is thus an outcome 
of an adjustment  process,  not  a description  of the channels  through  which  the policy 
variables affect changes  in net foreign  assets"  (p. 18). 
23. Two articles by Manuel Guitiin,  former director of the Monetary and Exchange Affairs 
department  and  distinguished  IMF official,  illustrate  this  point.  There  is  in  fact no 
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the economic  situation  with  which  Fund arrangements  are typically  de- 
signed  to  deal  and  of  the  institutional  process  associated  with  those 
arrangements,  there  is  a  rationale  for  setting  numerical  performance 
criteria in terms  of floors  on net  international  reserves  and  ceilings  on 
net domestic  credit. 
The primary rationale for setting  a performance  criterion for the floor 
on  net  international  reserves  actually  has  little  to  do  with  monetary 
policy,  or especially  with  the monetary  approach  to the balance  of pay- 
ments.  When  a member requests  a program, it usually  has run down  its 
international  reserves  and  is  anticipating  continued  downward  pres- 
sures.  Even if the exchange  rate has been  devalued  or allowed  to float, 
further substantial  declines  in reserves are usually  undesirable.  The poli- 
cies  associated  with  IMF arrangements  are  supposed  to  address  this 
problem  by  reducing  the  external  payments  imbalance  and  helping  to 
restore confidence;  and the financial  support  of the IMF provides  a de- 
sired supplement  to the member's  (gross) international  reserves.  Fund- 
supported  programs,  however,  do not  always  make rapid progress  to- 
wards  their  agreed  objectives,  and  oftentimes  this  reflects  (at  least 
partly) the  failure of the  member  to tighten  its macroeconomic  policies 
with  sufficient  resolve.  In such  situations,  if substantial  reserve  losses 
continue,  there  is  a  clear  signal  that  the  adjustment  program  is  not 
working  as  intended  in  an  area  of  critical importance  to  the  IMF  A 
performance  criterion  that  sets  a  floor  on  net  international  reserves 
hence  assures  that when  those reserves  fall below  an agreed threshold,  a 
reconsideration  of the program  is triggered,  with  the range of possible 
outcomes  described  in  Section  2.  The  legal  mandate  for IMF arrange- 
ments  and  the  associated  responsibility  of the  Fund  to not  put  at (too 
much) risk the revolving  character of its resources thus provide  a distinct 
rationale for conditionality  focused  on the level  of reserves. 
Quantitative  performance  criteria for monetary  policy  come  into play 
primarily in the setting  of ceilings  on net  domestic  credit of the central 
bank  (or  the  banking  system).24  In  the  balance  sheet  of  the  central 
credit  as an indicator  of monetary  policy  in IMF programs  between  his  1973 seminal 
article on the subject (Guitian, 1973) and an article written more than twenty  years later 
(Guitian,  1994), at a time  when  many  IMF members  had  abandoned  fixed  exchange 
rates, and financial innovation  and capital-market integration had wreaked  havoc with 
the  stability  of monetary  aggregates  in many  industrial  and emerging  market econo- 
mies.  Tellingly, the conference  discussant  of the  second  paper,  Henk Jager, expresses 
uneasiness  and  surprise  at  Guitian's  unqualified  presentation  of  the  monetary  ap- 
proach  to  the  balance  of payments  as a suitable  framework  for analyzing  monetary 
policy  in the short and medium  term in the 1990s (Jager, 1994). 
24. Whether  the ceilings  are set on net domestic  credit from the central bank or from the 
banking  system  is  a  decision  that  depends,  primarily,  on  the  degree  of  financial 112 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
bank,  the  sum  of  net  domestic  credit  and  net  international  reserves 
determine,  as fact of accounting,  the  quantity  of base  money.25 Hence, 
given  the  floor  on  net  international  reserves  set  by  the  performance 
criterion  on  this  component  of the  monetary  base,  setting  a ceiling  on 
net  domestic  credit  establishes  a  quasiceiling  on  base  money.  Base 
money  can be  above  this  quasiceiling  and  still be  in conformance  with 
the  performance  criteria, but  only  to  the  extent  that net  international 
reserves  are above their specified  floor. Why should  quantitative  perfor- 
mance  criteria for monetary  policy  be  set  in this way?  Many  times  the 
reason  a country  gets  into balance  of payments  difficulties  and  suffers 
reserve  losses  and  exchange-rate  pressures  is that monetary  policy  has 
been  too  expansionary;  base  money  has  been  allowed  to  expand  too 
rapidly relative to the growth  of sustainable  demand,  and net domestic 
credit  of  the  central  bank  has  grown  at  an  even  faster  rate  to  offset 
(sterilize) losses  of reserves.  In other cases-for  example  when  there is 
a sharp  reversal  of foreign  capital  inflows  or a sudden  bout  of capital 
flight-reserve  losses  may  not  derive  primarily  from excessive  money 
creation, but central banks typically will resist a large monetary  contrac- 
tion by sterilizing  reserve  losses  through  an offsetting  expansion  of net 
domestic  credit. In either circumstance,  under  a Fund arrangement  it is 
important  to provide  some  assurance  that expansionary  monetary  pol- 
icy  will  not  continue  to  be,  or become,  a  problem  that  undermines 
external viability. 
A performance  criterion that sets ceilings  on net domestic  credit of the 
central bank is an admittedly  crude way  of attempting  to provide  such 
assurance.  The ceilings  are typically  set by first estimating  (or guessing) 
a  reasonable  path  for base  money  under  the  program's  assumptions 
regarding  output  growth,  inflation,  exchange  rates,  seasonal  factors, 
and the behavior of velocity  and the money  multipliers.26 Subtracting the 
floor  on  net  international  reserves  yields  the  ceiling  on  net  domestic 
development  of the country  requesting  Fund support.  Ceilings  at the banking-system 
level  are  considered  more  appropriate  in  countries  where  the  financial  system  is 
relatively  underdeveloped  and  the  central  bank  resorts  to  direct  controls  or  other 
distortionary  means  to influence  credit  conditions.  Ceilings  at the  central-bank  level 
are generally  used  in countries  where  the  authorities  rely on  indirect instruments  of 
monetary  control-see  International  Monetary  Fund  1987 and Guitian  1994. The dis- 
cussion  that follows  is  confined  to  the  latter cases;  however,  the  thrust  of the  argu- 
ment  also applies  to the other cases. 
25. Suitable  definitions  of these  aggregates,  with  adjustments  for other items  on  the bal- 
ance sheet  and other  factors affecting  reserves  (which  comprise  what  Fund staff calls 
"other items net"),  assure that this statement  is true. 
26. For a fuller  discussion  see  International  Monetary  Fund  (1987) and  Polak  (1997); see 
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credit  that is  consistent  with  this  path  for base  money.27 Notably  and 
desirably,  this  procedure  does  not  impose  a ceiling  or a floor  on  the 
monetary  base.28 The rationale  for this is quite clear. If the demand  for 
base money  turns out to be higher than projected,  putting  upward  pres- 
sure  on  the  currency  and  international  reserves,  the  central bank  can 
accommodate  the higher demand  by allowing  the international-reserves 
component  of  the  monetary  base  to  expand.  Granting  this  flexibility, 
what about the uncertainties  in forecasting  the demand  for base money? 
Here,  there is no escape  from assuming  some  degree  of predictability of 
the demand  for money,  in accord with  some  quantifiable model.  In par- 
ticular, the numerical quasiceiling  for base money  will normally require a 
judgement  about how  the demand  for money  will behave  over the com- 
ing two to four quarters, given program assumptions  about the course of 
national  income,  capital  flows,  the  price  level,  interest  rates,  the  ex- 
change  rate, and (very importantly  in most  cases) seasonal  factors. This 
involves,  at  least  implicitly,  numerical  values  for  the  short-run  point 
elasticities  of  money  demand.  The  estimates  of  what  will  happen  to 
money  demand  must  then  be  translated  into  judgements  about  base 
money  by taking account  of the likely behavior  of the money  multiplier 
relationships,  which  are  often  unstable  in  environments  of  economic 
and financial difficulty. The result is essentially  an educated  guess  about 
how  the economically  appropriate  supply  of base  money  should  be ex- 
pected  to  evolve  over  the  following  six  to  twelve  months,  given  the 
program's  economic  and policy  assumptions.  This educated  guess,  em- 
bodied  in the performance criteria, is typically an outcome  of the negotia- 
tions with the authorities, not the result of rigorous statistical estimation. 
Admittedly,  forecasts  of  the  demand  for base  money  obtained  from 
this procedure  can be far off the mark. But the saving grace is the flexibil- 
ity in the process  behind  Fund-supported  programs.  Breaching the ceil- 
ing on net domestic  credit or the floor on net international  reserve  trig- 
gers  a reconsideration  and  possible  revision  of the Fund  arrangement, 
not  its termination.  What happens  depends  on  an assessment  of why 
the performance  criterion was breached,  on implications  going  forward, 
27. In some  cases, the baseline  path for net international  reserves used to calculate the path 
for net  domestic  credit  may  lie  above  the  performance  criterion for the  floor on  net 
international  reserves.  The issue  then  arises  of the  extent  to which  discrepancies  be- 
tween  the baseline  and the floor should  be sterilized  through  increases in net domestic 
credit. 
28. A number  of Fund arrangements  have in fact included  as performance  criteria ceilings 
on the monetary  base  rather than on domestic  credit. The staff's  evaluation  of mone- 
tary policy  in those  arrangements,  however,  by and large has followed  the same logic 
as  the  one  described  in  the  text-particularly  when  reducing  inflation  was  not  the 
primary  goal  of  the  Fund  arrangement  and  the  rate of  disinflation  envisaged  in the 
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and on the capacity  to agree on suitable policy  adjustments.  While  this 
process  does  not  guarantee  perfection,  it is surely  very  different from a 
rigid application  of a simplistic  version  of the monetary  approach to the 
balance of payments. 
To ensure  minimal consistency  among  the numerical  performance  cri- 
teria for fiscal,  monetary,  and  external-debt  policy  contained  in  every 
Fund  arrangement  it is necessary  to employ  a quantitative  framework. 
As mentioned  before,  the framework  that IMF staff developed  and con- 
tinues  to  use  for this  purpose  is called financial programming. Financial 
programming  is not a formal economic  model,  but rather a simple  flow- 
of-funds  framework  that  combines  basic  macro-accounting  identities 
and balance-sheet  constraints  which  the  staff uses  to gauge  the  size  of 
the  adjustment  effort required  from a country  experiencing  balance-of- 
payments  difficulties,  given assumptions  about  prospective  external  fi- 
nancing,  output  growth,  inflation,  and  exchange  rates.29 Even  in  its 
simplest  form,  financial  programming  does  involve  a small  number  of 
behavioral  equations  and  arbitrage  conditions-e.g.,  a  demand  for 
money,  a demand  for imports,  uncovered  interest  parity. Furthermore, 
the solution  for the values  of key performance criteria requires (approxi- 
mate) knowledge  of several key elasticities  and policy  multipliers.  How- 
ever,  values  for  these  key  parameters  are generally  not  estimated  by 
formal econometric  techniques.  Because  of the predominance  of unsta- 
ble  relationships  and  unreliable  data  in the  countries  requesting  Fund 
support,  the  estimates  that are used  mainly  represent  plausible  judge- 
ments,  based  on rough statistical work. 
In view  of the errors that inevitably  infect this process-or  any alterna- 
tive  process  for setting  numerical  performance  criteria-the  usefulness 
of  financial  programming  depends  not  so  much  on  the  accuracy  of 
its forecasts as on the flexibility for revising  the main numerical targets as 
new  information  becomes  available.  In fact,  all performance  criteria in 
Fund-supported  programs  are set conditional on assumptions  about the 
behavior  of  a  number  of  variables.  The  assumptions  are  rarely  kept 
unchanged  for  the  duration  of  the  program.  During  the  monitoring 
phase,  assumptions  are revisited  using  the latest information  for the key 
exogenous  variables,  projections  about  their future behavior  are modi- 
29. The  seminal  pieces  on  financial  programming  were  written  by  E. Walter Robichek, 
former director of the IMF's Western Hemisphere  Department  (Robichek,  1967, 1971, 
1985). Oral tradition and training manuals  prepared by the IMF's Institute (e.g.,  Inter- 
national  Monetary  Fund,  1981,  1996) helped  disseminate  the  financial-programming 
methodology.  Working  papers  of  Fund  staff  (e.g.,  Chand,  1987; Barth and  Chadha, 
1989; Mikkelsen,  1998) have  served  the same purpose.  For a critique of the increasing, 
and  in his  view  unwarranted,  "sophistication"  of financial  programming  in many  of 
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fied,  and,  if necessary,  numerical  performance  criteria are revised.  The 
scope  that this open-loop  feature of the approach  affords for exercising 
judgement  when  assessing  the  country's  performance  under  the  Fund 
arrangement  is  what  explains  why  IMF  financial  programming  has 
proved  so  resilient.  The  superficial  uniformity  that financial  program- 
ming  imparts to all Fund arrangements  is hence  a far cry from the view 
that portrays it as a standard and rigid economic  model  that is mechani- 
cally applied  to all program countries.30 
3.4 IMF  PROGRAMS  IN ACTION:  MEXICO,  1995-1996 
The Fund-supported  program for Mexico in 1995-1996  provides  a nota- 
ble  example  of  how  the  process  of  IMF programs  works  in  practice. 
During  1994,  Mexico  was  running  a  current-account  deficit  of  8% of 
GDP  and  suffered  large  reserve  losses  (which  were  sterilized  by  the 
Banco de  Mexico) when  a variety  of internal and external disturbances 
helped  to  undermine  confidence  (see  Annex  I in  the  May  1995 World 
Economic Outlook). The Mexican  authorities  did not  approach  the  Fund 
for an arrangement  until  after the peso  had  been  devalued  and subse- 
quently  allowed  to  float.  At  the  insistence  of  the  authorities,  the  ar- 
rangement  agreed  in January 1995 was based  on economic  assumptions 
that  were  quite  optimistic,  especially  in  hindsight.  Real GDP  growth 
was  projected  to  slow  from  3.5%  in  1994 to  1.5% in  1995 and  then 
recover.  Exchange-rate  depreciation  was  assumed  to be contained  with 
the  assistance  of  moderately  tight  monetary  policy.  Inflation,  on  a 
December-to-December  basis,  was  projected  to  rise  from  7% to  19% 
and  then  decline.  With  support  from  fiscal  measures  to  improve  the 
primary  government  balance  by  1.1  percentage  points  of  GDP  (very 
modest  by  the  standards  of  earlier  Fund  arrangements  with  Mexico), 
the  current  account  deficit  was  projected  to  shrink  from  8% to  4% of 
GDP-a  deficit  assessed  to  be  financeable  with  capital  inflows  and 
moderate  use  of  official  reserves.  Performance  criteria  for  the  initial 
program were set on the basis of these  assumptions. 
Confidence,  however,  was  not restored  by this initial program.  Mas- 
sive  capital outflows,  especially  by holders  of tesobonos,  led to large re- 
serve losses  and pushed  the peso  down  to half its precrisis value by early 
March. Inflation  soared;  the  December-to-December  rate reached  52%. 
30. In a recent  paper dealing with the legacy of "his"  model, Jacques  Polak  explains  why it 
is mistaken to portray financial programming  as a fully specified economic model; 
specifically,  he notes that "the  Fund has had to forego the comfort  of its old model and 
base its conditionality on a set of ad hoc instruments that seemed plausible in the 
circumstances.  ..  . Without  much  of  a model  to  go by,  the Fund  has in recent  years tended 
to adopt an 'all risk' policy ...  reserving for periodic reviews a judgment as to the 
need for additional ...  action"  (Polak,  1997,  pp. 15-16; italics  added). Figure 2 Mexico: Domestic  Credit (NDA)  and International Reserves  (NIR) in 
the  1995-1996  Standby  Arrangement:  Program  Targets and  Outcomes 
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Output  crashed;  real GDP ultimately  fell 7% in 1995, and real domestic 
demand  fell  more  than  double  that  amount.  The  current  account  im- 
proved  by 7.6 percentage  points  of GDP, reaching  near-balance  by year 
end.  To contain  the  depreciation  of the peso  and regain monetary  con- 
trol, in March the Banco de Mexico had to raise overnight  interest  rates 
temporarily  above 80%. 
What of  the  program's  performance  criteria? The fiscal targets were 
met scrupulously,  despite  the unexpectedly  deep  recession.  In fact, the 
March 1995 program review  tightened  the annual  fiscal target, and this 
target was  more than met.  For the monetary  program,  base  money  ran 
significantly  below  its quasiceiling  through  most  of  1995, reaching  the 
ceiling  at  year  end.  However,  as  illustrated  in  Figure  2  (where  the 
shaded  areas  show  the  acceptable  range  of  performance),  the  actual 
performance  criteria for the  floor on net  international  reserves  and the 
ceiling on net domestic  credit were both very badly breached  on the test 
dates corresponding  to the ends  of the first, second,  and fourth quarters 
of 1995. At the Fund, it was understood  that in the face of very large and 
unexpected  capital  outflows  and  reserve  losses,  the  Banco  de  Mexico 
had  to  expand  net  domestic  credit  well  beyond  the  agreed  ceiling  to 
avoid  a catastrophic  decline  of  base  money.  Given  the  determination 
shown  by the Mexican authorities  in the fiscal area, in interest-rate pol- 
icy, and  in the  behavior  of base  money,  violations  of the  performance 
criteria for net international reserves and net domestic  credit during 1995 
were waived.  The program proceeded  without  interruption.  By late 1995 
confidence  was  clearly recovering.  In 1996 growth  jumped  to 5%, and 
inflation  fell  by  25  percentage  points.  All  performance  criteria of  the 
program  for the first half of the year were  met,  by wide  margins  in the 
monetary  area,  and  Mexico  regained  access  to private  capital  markets 
and decided  not to draw the remaining  tranches  of the IMF loan. 
4.  Conclusion 
The example  of Mexico illustrates how  IMF-supported programs work in 
practice, in accord with  the iterative process  described  in Section  2 and 
involving  the substantive  elements  and quantitative  approach to macro- 
economic  policymaking  discussed  in  Section  3.  In this particular case, 
given  the  urgency  of the  situation,  the  phases  of inception,  blueprint, 
negotiation,  and  approval  proceeded  very  rapidly  and  concluded  with 
an  agreement  on  a Fund  arrangement  that  involved  an  exceptionally 
large financial support.  However,  the economic  assumptions  of the ini- 
tial program proved  overly optimistic,  and the quantitative  performance 
criteria for net  domestic  credit and net international  reserves  were  seri- 118 *  MUSSA  & SAVASTANO 
ously  breached.  In the  monitoring  phase  of the  arrangement  this  was 
handled,  first, by  revising  the  main  assumptions  of the  1995 program 
and,  more  substantively,  by  granting  waivers  for the  breached  perfor- 
mance  criteria, as it was  judged  that the  policy  efforts  of the  Mexican 
authorities  had  been  forceful  and  appropriate  to  meet  the  extremely 
adverse  circumstances  they confronted. 
Other  IMF-supported  programs  follow  somewhat  different  courses. 
For instance,  in the recent Fund arrangements  for Thailand and Korea, 
initial program  assumptions  envisioned  slowdowns  in growth  but  not 
the  severe  recessions  that  actually  ensued.  During  the  monitoring 
phase,  prescriptions  for fiscal policy  needed  to be  substantially  modi- 
fied,  from  moderate  restraint  to  significant  support.  With  these  and 
other  agreed  modifications,  the programs  proceeded  without  interrup- 
tion. In the case of Indonesia,  in contrast, the efforts of the authorities  to 
meet  the  macroeconomic  and  structural  performance  requirements  of 
the initial program approved  in November  1997 and of the revised  pro- 
gram agreed on with the staff in February 1998 were judged  to be inade- 
quate, and the Fund arrangement  went  off track. Subsequent  agreement 
with a new  government  on a substantially  modified  program has proved 
much  more successful  and has generally  proceeded  without  serious  de- 
lay. In the case of Brazil, the interval between  inception  (involving  inter- 
nal discussions  of Fund staff and management)  and approval of the IMF 
program  in  November  1998 was  somewhat  longer  than  in  the  other 
cases.  The  initial  program  featured  significant  fiscal  consolidation  to 
boost  confidence  in the continuation  of the Real Plan and to contain and 
curtail a rapidly rising public-debt  ratio. When  the exchange-rate  policy 
proved  unsustainable  in the face of large reserve losses,  the arrangement 
went  off  track. A  revised  program,  still with  fiscal consolidation  at its 
core  but  with  a flexible  exchange  rate  and  a monetary  policy  geared 
toward low  inflation,  has so far proved  more auspicious. 
Other cases  show  an even  wider  range of experience  with  the actual 
evolution  of  Fund-supported  programs  through  their  six  operational 
phases.  Indeed,  while  the IMF maintains  a general policy  of uniformity 
of treatment  of its members,  the  fact is that Fund-supported  programs 
are  far from  uniform-notwithstanding  their  superficial  resemblance. 
The  reason  for  this  is  simply  that  IMF members  have  quite  different 
economies,  face  different  problems  necessitating  adjustments  in  their 
balance of payments,  and display  a variety of policy  regimes  and differ- 
ent ability and willingness  to implement  policies  to correct external pay- 
ments  imbalances  and  their underlying  causes.  IMF programs  need  to 
be, and are, flexible instruments  for addressing  those problems,  within  a 
general  framework  that  has  a  quantitative  dimension  and  imposes  a The IMF Approach  to Economic  Stabilization  * 119 
necessary  degree  of  consistency  and  discipline  across  users  of  Fund 
resources. 
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Comment 
MARTIN EICHENBAUM 
Northwestern  University,  NBER,  and Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Chicago 
This  paper  will  be  of  value  to  anyone  interested  in  IMF stabilization 
programs.  But it is not an easy paper  to discuss,  as it contains  neither  a 
theoretical model  nor new  empirical  results.  Instead  the paper  exposits 
and  defends,  in broad  terms,  the  IMF approach  to economic  stabiliza- 
tion.  By this the authors mean  the Fund's short-term  tactics for stabiliz- 
ing  currency  crises.  The paper  succeeds  in defending  the  Fund  from a 
subset  of its critics. My main criticism of it is that it does not address  the 
Fund's  most  serious  critics: those  who  charge that the IMF's short-term 
tactics for stabilizing  currency crises raise the likelihood  of future crises. 
My comment  lays out one version  of this critique and urges the authors 
to reply in future research. 
As  laid  out  by  the  authors,  the  objectives  of  their  paper  are to  (1) 
summarize  the  process  by which  IMF programs  are set up,  (2) explain 
why  the  IMF conditions  aid on  various  monetary  and fiscal policy  tar- 
gets,  and  (3) defend  the  IMF from charges  that its programs  are exces- 
sively  rigid  and  based  on  an  outmoded  economic  model.  To varying 
degrees  the paper succeeds  in accomplishing  all three objectives. 
A little more than half of the paper is devoted  to (1). I have little to add 
here.  Surely describing  the details of how  the Fund sets up its programs 
is the authors' comparative  advantage,  not mine.  Also,  with  one impor- 
tant exception,  I have  little to argue with  regarding (2). The exception  is 
that I would  like to see much more detail about how  the Fund calculates 
its  monetary  and  fiscal  targets.  After  all,  God  is in  the  details.  And  I 
don't understand  the details of these  calculations  any better having  read 
the paper. 
Turning to the paper's  third objective,  I come  to my major complaint. 
The  paper  never  grapples  with  the  charge  that  the  IMF's  successful 
short-term tactics for stabilizing  currency crises increase the likelihood  of 
future crises occurring.  The Fund has many  critics. Some  deserve  to be 
taken  seriously.  Others  don't.  In the  latter group  I include  those  who 
charge that (1) the IMF staff blindly  applies  the same  simplistic  formula 
to all crises,  (2) the IMF should  abandon  conditionality,  and (3) the IMF 
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has perversely  encouraged  countries  that are in the throes of a currency 
crisis to pursue  contractionary  monetary  and fiscal policy. The evidence 
against  the  first charge  is  overwhelming.  The  second  charge  is  tanta- 
mount  to urging  the IMF to abandon  its charter. Finally, there is no firm 
scientific basis for criticizing the Fund on the basis of the third charge. In 
the midst of a currency crisis, one way or another, you need  to stabilize a 
country's  current  account.  In practice  this  means  securing  sustainable 
external  financing  for the  country  and  generating  current-account  sur- 
pluses.  The most effective way to do that is contractionary monetary and 
fiscal  policy.  Like  the  authors,  I don't  know  of  any  evidence  to  the 
contrary. 
By focusing  on  the  Fund's  least  persuasive  critics,  the  authors  have 
missed  a valuable  opportunity  to defend  the IMF from its most  persua- 
sive  ones,  whose  position  I summarize  as follows.1  In its search  for a 
post-Bretton  Woods  mission,  the  IMF is trying  to become  an  interna- 
tional lender  of last resort. The Fund cannot  successfully  play  this role. 
Even if the IMF had the mandate and the resources to move  decisively  in 
the midst  of a crisis, it would  not have  the regulatory  powers  normally 
associated  with  successful  lenders  of last resort. Anticipating  this prob- 
lem,  the  Fund has  tried to develop  new  forms  of conditionality  which 
involve  detailed  structural and institutional  reforms in client countries. 
Increasingly  these  pertain  to  the  structure  of  the  financial  sectors  in 
those  countries. 
There are at least  two  reasons  to be  skeptical  of these  new  forms  of 
conditionality.  First, it is far more  difficult for the Fund to monitor  and 
regulate the financial sector of sovereign  states than it is for central banks. 
Given  political  realities and  the  limited  enforcement  mechanisms  at its 
disposal,  the Fund is unlikely to be able to reform a banking system before  a 
crisis occurs. Second,  banking reforms take longer to implement  than the 
horizon  of a typical  IMF program  period.  So IMF funds  are inevitably 
disbursed  after a crisis occurs but before reforms actually happen. 
According  to  the  critics,  because  the  Fund  cannot  credibly  impose 
structural reforms on client countries,  it has become  an unwilling  partici- 
pant  and  facilitator of bank bailouts  and  loan  guarantee  schemes-the 
proximate  causes  of many,  although  not  all, of the  post-1980  currency 
crises.  True, the IMF does  not directly bail out banks or countries.  But it 
does  provide  loans  at below-market  rates.  More importantly,  the Fund 
helps  provide  the political  cover for governments  to raise the resources 
required to pay off loans and carry out bank bailouts.  Unfortunately,  the 
people  who  benefit  from  the bailouts  aren't the  ones  whose  taxes  are 
1. See  for example  Calomiris  (1998), Chari and Kehoe  (1998), and the references  therein. 124 *  EICHENBAUM 
ultimately  raised.  So,  at  least  indirectly,  the  Fund  contributes  to  the 
moral-hazard  problems  that  are  pervasive  in  the  financial  sectors  of 
emerging  (and other) market economies. 
To the  extent  that one  takes  the  previous  critique  seriously,  the  key 
question  becomes:  How  can the Fund achieve  the benefits  of short-term 
interventions  without  exacerbating the perverse incentives  faced by lend- 
ers in emerging  markets and their foreign creditors? Presumably  the an- 
swer  to the previous  question  depends  on what  causes  currency  crises. 
According  to many of the Fund's critics, the quasiliberalization  of world 
financial  markets  that  has  occurred  has  led  to  new  kinds  of  currency 
crises,  of  a type  not  anticipated  by  standard  macroeconomic  models. 
Some  believe  that  these  "new"  currency  crises  are  essentially  self- 
fulfilling prophecies  unrelated to moral-hazard issues  or the fundamental 
health  of the  countries  involved  (see  for example  Chang  and  Velasco, 
1999). From this  perspective,  the  Fund's  actions  in Asia  punished  the 
victims of the crime, not the perpetrators. Tight monetary and fiscal policy 
just damaged  otherwise  sound  financial systems. 
Other researchers  argue that the roots of many  recent currency crises 
can be traced to moral-hazard  problems  associated  with  financial dereg- 
ulation,  the end  of capital controls,  and  ongoing  implicit  guarantees  to 
corporations,  banks,  and their foreign  creditors.  In fact, substantial  evi- 
dence  supports  the view  that banking  crises  have  become  increasingly 
severe  and  are now  more  closely  linked  to currency crises.  Since  1982, 
there have been over ninety episodes  of severe banking crises. The worst 
of these  involve  losses  to  taxpayers  of  unprecedented  magnitude.  For 
example,  in more  than  twenty  of the  post-1982  cases,  bailout  costs  ex- 
ceeded  10% of the affected country's GDP. In roughly half of those  cases, 
including  the recent Southeast Asian episodes,  the losses have been in the 
range of 25% of GDP.2 Finally, currency crises are more correlated with 
banking  crises in the post-1980  era than in the pre-1980 era.3 
The increase  in the  rate and  severity  of banking  crises  reflects  three 
factors: currency  controls  were  far less  pervasive  in the  post-1980  era, 
governments  didn't  subsidize  risktaking  by  banks  nearly  as  much  as 
they  do  now,  and  international  agencies,  like  the  IMF, didn't  help  to 
insulate  foreign creditors from default risk as much. 
But why  should banking crises be linked to currency crises? Here there 
are at least  two  possibilities:  fundamental  shocks  to the banking  sector, 
and self-fulfilling  expectational  links.  To illustrate the first channel,  sup- 
2. To put this figure into perspective, the losses to U.S. taxpayers  from the savings-and- 
loan  crises  was  roughly  3% of U.S.  GDP. Losses  from bank  failures  during  the  Great 
Depression  years  of 1930-1933  equaled  roughly  4% of U.S.  GDP. See Calomiris  (1998). 
3. See Kaminsky, Lizondo,  and Reinhart (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999). Comment  125 
pose  that real shocks to an economy  cause higher bankruptcy rates in the 
banking sector that trigger large fiscal obligations on the part of the govern- 
ment. These shocks could reflect shifts in either the supply  or the demand 
for the products  of the banks'  customers.  One  concrete  example  is pro- 
vided  by  Thailand,  where  banks  made  substantial  loans  to  firms  that 
invested  heavily in real estate projects that began to yield negative rates of 
return prior to the currency crises. Under these  circumstances  a banking 
crisis could  lead  to a currency crisis because  of large prospective  deficits 
associated  with implicit bailout guarantees  to failing banks. To the extent 
that market participants  expect  that future  deficits  will  be  financed,  at 
least  in  part,  by  higher  seignorage  revenues,  future  monetary  policy 
would  be perceived  as being inconsistent  with  the maintenance  of fixed 
exchange  rates.  This would  lead  to a currency  crisis before  the deficits 
actually begin to be monetized.4  From this perspective,  government  guar- 
antees  are the  key  conduits  by  which  real shocks  transform  a banking 
crisis into a currency collapse. 
The second  connection  between  banking  and  currency  crises  is that 
the presence  of government  guarantees  opens  up the possibility  of self- 
fulfilling twin banking-currency  crises. Suppose  that for extraneous  rea- 
sons market participants come to expect that the government  will pursue 
a monetary  policy  that  is  inconsistent  with  the  maintenance  of  fixed 
exchange  rates. These beliefs  can be self-fulfilling  in the sense  that they 
lead  to a successful  currency  attack and  a future  monetary  policy  that 
actually is inconsistent  with  the maintenance  of fixed exchange  rates. 
To see  how  this  might  work,  suppose  that  because  of  government 
guarantees,  banks  are unhedged  against  exchange-rate  risk.  Burnside, 
Eichenbaum,  and Rebelo (1999) argue that a bank's optimal strategy is to 
be  unhedged  when  its foreign  creditors  are insulated  from the  default 
risks  associated  with  a devaluation.5  Many  banks  would  therefore  go 
broke after a devaluation.  This in turn triggers the government's  obliga- 
tions  to banks'  creditors.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  government 
would  have  to meet  its fiscal obligations,  at least in part, via seignorage 
revenues.  So  if  market  participants  believe  that  the  government  will 
4. Burnside,  Eichenbaum,  and Rebelo  (1998) argue that this connection  between  banking 
and  currency  crises was  operative  during  the  recent Thai and Korean currency crises. 
5. In fact, in their model,  it is optimal  for banks to magnify  exchange-rate  risk by entering 
into forward positions  which  lose money  when  there is a devaluation.  See also Mishkin 
(1996) and Obstfeld  (1998), who  argue that a government's  promise  to maintain  a fixed 
exchange  rate  is  often  interpreted  by  the  financial  industry  as  an  implicit  guarantee 
against  the  adverse  consequences  of  a devaluation.  Consistent  with  this  hypothesis, 
many researchers argue that firms and financial intermediaries  borrow extensively  from 
abroad prior to the onset  of a currency crises but do not completely  hedge  exchange-rate 
risk. See for example,  IMF (1998, p. 17) for a discussion  of the recent crises in Indonesia, 
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meet future fiscal obligations  by seignorage  revenues,  then they will take 
actions  that  trigger  these  fiscal  obligations  and  the  need  to  raise 
seignorage  revenues.  So there will be a self-fulfilling,  apparently rational 
run on the currency, followed  by a devaluation,  a banking  crisis, trans- 
fers to bank creditors, and a partial monetization  of the debt. Indeed,  the 
attack may set off a chain of self-fulfilling  attacks on different currencies, 
i.e.  contagion. 
Note  that under  either the  fundamental  or the  self-fulfilling-expecta- 
tions scenario discussed  above, currency crises are tightly linked to bank- 
ing crises. Actions  taken by domestic  governments  or international  agen- 
cies that exacerbate  the moral-hazard  problem  faced by banks  raise the 
probability  of  future  currency  crises.  To the  extent  that  one  takes  this 
problem  seriously,  the task confronting  the IMF is to assess  the extent to 
which  their successful  short-run strategies  for stabilizing  currency crises 
affect  the  likelihood  of  future  crises.  On  this  issue  Mussa  and  Sava- 
stano's paper is silent. That is a pity. No doubt they have much to say on 
this,  the critical issue  confronting  policymakers  at the Fund. 
I conclude  by reiterating that I learned  a lot from this paper. The fact 
that I've urged  the  authors  to write  a sequel  doesn't  detract from what 
they  have  done.  They  have  forcefully  responded  to  a  subset  of  the 
Fund's  critics. The reader must  wait  for the  sequel  to see  how  the  au- 
thors respond  to the other critics. 
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Discussion 
In  reply  to  the  comments  of  the  formal  discussants,  Michael  Mussa 
emphasized  that the  scope  of their paper  is the  IMF approach  to eco- 
nomic  stabilization,  which  is why  they did not address  issues  relating to 
moral  hazard  and  the  international-lender-of-last-resort  function.  He 
noted,  however,  that  the  problem  of  fragility  of  financial  systems  in 
emerging  market economies  had  led,  even  prior to recent  crises,  to at- 
tempts  by  international  institutions  to  create  a  set  of  standards  that 
countries  would  be  encouraged  to adopt.  Morris Goldstein  of the  IMF 
led  this effort in  1996, and  the  Bank for International  Settlements  took 
over the project subsequently.  This initiative illustrates that the IMF was 
trying to act preemptively  on financial fragility and not just after the fact. 
Mussa  also  expressed  skepticism  about  the  heavy  weight  being  at- 
tached to the moral-hazard  issue.  He noted  that in Mexico the problem 
was  not  just  banking  instability  but  the  possibility  of  default  on  the 
tesobonos.  If Mexico had defaulted  on the tesobonos,  it would  have lost 
access  to  international  capital  markets  on  a sustained  basis,  imposing 
large costs on the country. The IMF's efforts to avert sovereign  default in 
Mexico were thus necessary,  even though  creditors were also helped.  He 
added  that the IMF is not paying  for the Mexican banks' losses  and that 
the  Mexican  taxpayers  are  stuck  with  that  bill.  Mussa  also  used  the 
examples  of Thailand  and Indonesia  to point  out that external creditors 
have not been made whole  in every case. The decision  to stop providing 
bailouts  to Russia should  have  sent  the powerful  message  that, no mat- 
ter how  important  a  country  is,  international  support  including  IMF 
loans is conditional  on reasonable policy  performance  and in any case is 
not unlimited.  It is thus incorrect to characterize the IMF as being exces- 
sively  prone  to bailing  out countries  and institutions  in trouble. 
Martin Feldstein  said  that  issues  pertaining  to  the  denomination  of 
private debts were not mentioned  in the paper. He noted  that the typical 
problem  of countries  seeking  IMF help  is a current-account  deficit  that 
needs  to be reduced,  and the  traditional  formula is to devalue  and de- 
flate.  However,  devaluation  is actually  very  contractionary in countries 
like Thailand  in which  corporate  foreign-currency  borrowing  has been 
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not unlimited.  It is thus incorrect to characterize the IMF as being exces- 
sively  prone  to bailing  out countries  and institutions  in trouble. 
Martin Feldstein  said  that  issues  pertaining  to  the  denomination  of 
private debts were not mentioned  in the paper. He noted  that the typical 
problem  of countries  seeking  IMF help  is a current-account  deficit  that 
needs  to be reduced,  and the  traditional  formula is to devalue  and de- 
flate.  However,  devaluation  is actually  very  contractionary in countries 
like Thailand  in which  corporate  foreign-currency  borrowing  has been 128 *  DISCUSSION 
so  massive  that corporations  (and  ultimately  also  their creditor banks) 
find  themselves  bankrupt  when  there  is a large  devaluation.  Feldstein 
added  that in such  a case the last thing  that is needed  is contractionary 
fiscal  and  monetary  policies  to  further  reduce  aggregate  demand.  He 
asked  whether  the  IMF explicitly  takes  into  account  the  deflationary 
impact of devaluation  through the foreign-debt  channel  when  designing 
its programs.  Mussa  responded  by  saying  that debt  issues  of this  type 
are viewed  as central to Fund programs. For example, getting the interna- 
tional banks to roll over Korean external debt was essential  to the success 
of stabilizing  the won  and bringing  it back to a reasonable level.  Indeed, 
financial weakness  in Asia was a major motivation  for the Fund's recom- 
mendations  to raise interest rates, because  rate increases help to prevent 
devaluation  by reducing  capital outflows. 
Michael  Hutchison  commented  that in Korea many people  think that 
some  of the restructuring in IMF programs  seems  to be more relevant to 
the government's  own  agenda for change than to the need  for macroeco- 
nomic  reforms.  Essentially,  the  government  uses  IMF backing  to push 
through  programs  that  otherwise  do  not  have  domestic  political  sup- 
port.  Mussa  agreed  that  the  IMF  sometimes  effectively  plays  what 
amounts  to a political  role,  but added  that governments  should  not be 
viewed  as unitary  actors.  For example,  the  IMF often  works  with  the 
finance ministries  and central banks against the spending  ministries  and 
other  constituencies.  In the  case  of  Korea,  independently  of  domestic 
political  concerns,  corporate  restructuring  was  a concern  of  the  Fund 
because  high  precrisis  corporate  leverage  ratios had  made  the  Korean 
financial system  extremely  fragile. The Fund pursued  corporate restruc- 
turing because  it was viewed  as being very important for avoiding  future 
difficulties. 